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This thesis investigates the role of cognition in the broader field of agricultural and food eco-
nomics. Three studies in the thesis each targets on one aspect of human behavior.
Study 1 deals with non-standard belief. Using overconfidence and self-attribution, study 1 in-
vestigates how consumers react to temporary quality failure and perceive food safety risk depending
on previous consumption experience. Results showed that people decrease the consumption when
facing ambiguous signals regarding the food quality, but would not cease to eat altogether. Due
to a taste of consistency, participants updated their risk perceptions and judgments based on their
eating behaviors. Though experienced consumers picked up signals faster, their judgment was not
better than those non-users due to a much stronger psychological bias.
Study 2 deals with non-standard decision-making. Using psychological terms such as cognitive
dissonance and confirmation bias, study 2 reveals how individual consumers inadequately process
information, pay limited attention to signals, and make decisions bias towards their initial choices.
Results suggested that consumer’s judgment and information processing depend a lot on their
initial beliefs or consumption status. They used higher bidding prices to justify previous behaviors
and selectively paid attention to information in favor of their initial choices. In terms of market
responses, due to psychological biases among consumers, demand curves were less possible to shift
down under food safety risk.
Study 3 deals with non-standard preference and its market responses. Results showed that
asymmetric adverse incentive structure made a risk-averse loan officer inclined to reject loans to
avoid risk of penalty. It provides micro explanations for macro level credit rationing phenomenon
in the financial market. Lenders’ reference-dependent utility under asymmetric adverse incentive
structure broadens literature on institutional mechanism design to a behavioral scope.
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1 Chapter 1
Overview
The classic economic theory builds on a simple but powerful model of behavior. It assumes individual
agents are Bayesian information processors; have well-defined and stable preferences; maximize their
expected utility; exponentially discount future well-being; are self-interested, narrowly defined; have
preferences over final outcomes, not changes; have only “instrumental”/functional taste for beliefs
and information, and are independent of the framing of the decision (Rabin, 2002).
Economic theories should be judged by three criteria: congruence with reality, generality, and
tractability (Stigler, 1965). Over the past few decades, The research in Psychology and Economics
(a.k.a. Behavioral Economics) suggests that individuals deviate from the standard model in three
respects: (i) non-standard preferences; (ii) non-standard beliefs; and (iii) non-standard decision-
making (DellaVigna, 2009). In the class of non-standard preferences, there are time preferences
(self-control problems), risk preferences (reference dependence), and social preferences. On non-
standard beliefs, there is evidence, for instance, on overconfidence, on the law of small numbers,
and on projection bias. Regarding non-standard decision-making, there are i.e. framing, limited
attention, menu effects, persuasion and social pressure, and emotions.
The historical development of Behavioral Economics presents 3 waves: First, identify anoma-
lies—i.e., demonstrate clear violations of the assumption or model, and painstakingly rule out alter-
native explanations (such as subjects’ confusion or transactions costs). Second, use the anomalies
as inspiration to create alternative theories that generalize existing models. And third, construct
economic models of behavior using the behavioral assumptions from the second step, derive fresh
implications, and (empirically) test them.
As documented by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004), beginning around 1960, cognitive psychol-
ogy became dominated by the metaphor of the brain as an information-processing device replacing
the behaviorist conception of the brain as a stimulus-response machine. The information-processing
metaphor permitted a fresh study of neglected topics like memory, problem solving and decision
making. These new topics were more obviously relevant to the neoclassical conception of utility
maximization than behaviorism had appeared to be. Psychologists such as Ward Edwards, Duncan
Luce, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, began to use economic models as a benchmark against
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which to contrast their psychological models.
The two most influential contributions were published by Tversky and Kahneman. Their 1974
article in Science argued that heuristic short-cuts created probability judgments which deviated
from statistical principles. Their 1979 paper “Prospect theory: decision making under risk” docu-
mented violations of expected utility and proposed an axiomatic theory, grounded in psychophysical
principles, to explain the violations. Later, during late 1980s and 1990s, more social scientists de-
voted to behavioral economics and made its development transited gradually from the first wave to
the second wave. Rabin (1998, 2002) provide good survey of works within this period.
The recent past decade is a mixture of the second and the third wave. DillaVigna (2009)
provides a comprehensive survey of the fruitful empirical research during this time. Different from
previous work, DillaVigna’s review was organized by psychological principles, rather than specific
application topics. He also presented evidence on how rational actors - firms, employers, CEOs,
investors, and politicians - respond to the non-standard behavior described in the survey; and finally,
briefly discussed under what conditions experience and market interactions limit the impact of the
non-standard features.
Studies of risk, perceptions and psychology at the cognitive scale have been very limited in the
broader field of agricultural and food economics, yet in this area, and perhaps food in particular,
the role of cognition could explain consumption behavior and demand characteristics beyond au-
tarky. This thesis investigates the role of cognition across three subject areas, and establishes the
reasonableness of the neoclassical model under imperfect or asymmetric market conditions.
In detail, in study 1, an experiment was conducted to investigate the interaction between con-
sumers’ past eating behaviors, risk perceptions and future information processing procedure. In
the study, participants were required to choose whether or not to eat chicken that was potentially
be tainted with Avian Influenza (AI). Results showed that people decreased the consumption when
facing ambiguous signals regarding the food quality, but would not cease to eat altogether. Due
to a taste of consistency, participants updated their risk perceptions and judgments based on their
eating behaviors. The more chicken individuals ate the more favorably they tended to rate the
food, suggesting confirmatory bias. Even though consumers with previous experience could pick up
signals faster, their judgment was not better than those non-users due to a much stronger psycho-
logical bias. This study offered an explanation for why consumers were universally irresponsive to
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public food safety information.
Study 2 investigated how individual consumers react to food safety information and make pur-
chase decision. While it is expected that reading extra information about potential risk associated
with food decreases consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP), the magnitude of the impact varies across
individuals. Based on findings in psychology, consumer’s judgment and information processing may
depend a lot on their initial beliefs or consumption status. Using an incentive compatible auction
mechanism, this study elicited consumers’ WTP under different informational settings. Results
showed that consumers bid much higher when they freely chose food items (treatment) than when
they were randomly assigned (control), suggesting cognitive dissonance. On average, the bidding
premium was about 13 cents (roughly 30%) higher for low-risk food item and 30 cents (almost
60%) higher for high-risk item. The bidding premiums were further enlarged as food safety infor-
mation was revealed to consumers. Confirmatory bias hypothesis was supported by the finding that
free-choice group was more reluctant to change the bids despite of increased risk perceptions. In
terms of market responses, due to psychological biases among consumers, demand curves were less
possible to shift down under food safety risk. Results in this study implied that consumers were
less responsive to public information due to their existing habits. Extra strategies would be needed
to increase the efficiency of public communication to promote health.
In study 3, a field experiment was conducted to test loan decision behaviors. In this study the
principal instrument for affecting risk perceptions are incentive mechanisms imposed by a regulatory
authority. To what extent the incentives distort attitudes towards risk is also a problem in psychol-
ogy, albeit one that has not been explored in detail previously. This study investigates how does
incentive mechanism alter the perceptions of risk or the judgements about risk taking activities, i.e.
Type I vs Type II error in lending decisions.
Study 3 showed that lenders’ risk-aversion and behavioral responses resulted in credit rationing
under certain incentive schemes. In the experiment, loan officers from Rural Credit Cooperatives
(RCCs) in Shandong, China were recruited to evaluate randomly selected loan applications and
make lending decisions. All the loan files were previously approved with known performance and
repayment status. Each loan officer was randomly assigned to one of two incentive groups. One was
analogous to pure Personal Responsibility System (PRS), which provided bonuses to loan officers for
approved loans that were in performance and imposed penalties on non-performing loans (NPLs).
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And the other was PRS with additional penalties for Type II error (i.e. rejecting loans that would
have been good). The two groups were further randomized over prior knowledge about probability
distribution of the application pool. Results showed that PRS made a risk-averse loan officer inclined
to reject loans to avoid risk of penalty. This side effect generated credit rationing, increased Type
II error in loan classification and lowered the interest returns of RCCs. Providing prior information
about the application pool helped to increase decision accuracy. In theory, this study extended the
incentive mechanism design under uncertainty to a behavioral scope. In practical, it contributed to
the increase of profitability in financial institutes, alleviated credit rationing and stabilized credit
supply in the market.
Three studies in the thesis each targets on one aspect of human behavior. The remaining context
is organized as follows: Chapter 2, 3, and 4 each presents one individual study as described above.
Chapter 2 (Study 1) deals with non-standard belief. Using overconfidence and self-attribution,
study 1 investigates how consumers react to temporary quality failure and perceive food safety
risk depending on previous consumption experience. Chapter 3 (Study 2) deals with non-standard
decision-making. Using psychological terms such as cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias,
study 2 reveals how individual consumers inadequately process information, pay limited attention
to signals, and make decisions bias towards their initial choices. Chapter 4 (Study 3) deals with
non-standard preference and its market responses. It provides micro explanations for macro level
credit rationing phenomenon in the financial market. Lenders’ reference-dependent utility under
asymmetric adverse incentive structure broadens literature on institutional mechanism design to a
behavioral scope. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the whole thesis.
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2 Chapter 2
Study 1: Consumer Belief and Risk Perception under Temporary
Quality Failure
2.1 Introduction
Food safety issues have been a major concern for both public health and food industry. In general,
public regulatory agencies and private food companies should be responsible to minimize the food
safety risk and provide related information. However, a significant amount of control over these
health risks lies in the hands of the consumers, who are the final decision makers of consumption.
In this sense, it is of great importance to better understand consumers’ risk perception and reaction
to related information. Previous studies suggested food safety information is relatively ineffective
in changing consumers’ behavior (Downs, Loewenstein and Wisdom, 2009), but very few of them
offered a reason. This study uses experimental evidence to identify cognitive dissonance and its
subsequent behavioral impacts on consumers’ risk attitudes and response to information in a food
safety context. The results of the experiment provide some explanations for why typical consumers
are less responsive to food safety scares.
Cognitive dissonance is a state of discomfort caused by individual holding two contradictory
beliefs (Leon Festinger, 1957). By cognitive dissonance theory, past behavior and experience may
induce consumers to adjust their beliefs to rationalize their behavior (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982).
Wessells, Kline and Anderson (1996) used survey data and showed consumers’ perceptions of seafood
safety were influenced by their past experiences. Further, the perceptions influenced the anticipated
changes in consumption under different information settings. However, in reality, past behavior
and experience could also impact consumers’ reaction to information, especially when the signals
are ambiguous. Confirmatory bias is a natural tendency to reduce dissonance (Frey, 1986). For
one thing, it can lead individual to selectively seek confirming evidence and neglect disconfirming
evidence. For another, it causes consumers to interpret the ambiguous evidence in a more favorable
way (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). Lin, Lee and Yen (2004) found evidence for the first type of
confirmation bias, arguing that dietary intakes affect consumers’ search of nutrient information.
Our study will extend the existing research in the following ways: First, we differentiate past
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experience and one-time shot behavior to investigate the short-term behavioral effect on perception
and its interaction with long-term experience. Second, we exgogenously introduce ambiguous signal
of the food and investigate how does risk perception change with the signal and past experience.
Third, different interpretations of the ambiguous signal would provide evidence for the second type
of confirmation bias.
The experiment used in this study was conducted in Ithaca, New York 2007. 61 subjects were
invited to a buffet with chicken entree from a local store and 5 other side dishes. 29 in the control
group ate the normal main dish and 32 in the treatment group ate chicken mixed with fish sauce.
Fish sauce gave a strong smell which performed as an ambiguous external signal indicating the
food being potentially tainted. Subjects were further divided by their self-reported past experience
with the local store. The results showed risk perceptions were influenced by the existence of the
signal, the amount of food eaten and past experience. When food was mixed with fish sauce, users
perceived higher risk than non-users conditional on the amount of chicken eaten. However, risk
perception decreased as the users ate more chicken, suggesting cognitive dissonance. Further, the
users’ intention of interpreting the taste signal as being safe was also higher with more chicken eaten,
which is consistent with the hypothesis of confirmatory bias. Other responses such as satisfaction
of the food and anticipated future consumption were also investigated under different conditions.
Since food safety issues involve a lot of uncertainty, consumers’ perceptions depend heavily on
their experience and past behaviors. With ambiguous signals, the interpretations are also different
depending on the initial perceptions. In order to devise effective communication strategies, we
suggest information providers, either policy-makers or private companies, differentiate case by case
when offering messages to the public.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance theory was originally formulated in the mid-1950s by Leon Festinger and
its first complete version was presented in 1957. It is used to refer to the uncomfortable feeling
aroused from holding two contradicting attitudes, beliefs or behaviors. To put it more formally, as
theorized Festinger, when an individual holds two or more elements of knowledge that are relevant
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to each other but inconsistent with one another, a state of discomfort is created. A person who has
just bought a car but later finds that the maintenance fee could be very high will feel dissonance
because of their former belief that the car is a good choice. When one holds a certain belief but
is also forced to act against that, disagreement or dissonance exists between the action and the
previously held belief. Motivated by the unpleasant state of dissonance people will further engage
in some “psychological work” so as to reduce the inconsistency, and typically this work will support
the cognition which is most resistant to change. When returning a car to the dealer is impossible,
the owner tends to believe only good car requires higher maintenance fee and maybe the cost is
acceptable. A person who just did something irrevocable but is opposite to his long-held belief may
regard that belief as less important than before.
In general, to reduce the dissonance, individual could add consonant cognitions, subtract dis-
sonant cognitions, increase the importance of consonant cognitions or decrease the importance of
dissonant cognitions. One of the most often assessed ways of reducing dissonance is change in at-
titudes. Attitude change is expected to be in the direction of the cognition that is most resistant
to change. In test of the theory, it is often assumed that the knowledge about recent behavior is
usually most resistant to change, since if a person behaved in a certain way, it is often very difficult
to undo the behavior. Thus, attitude change would be made consistent with the recent behavior.
Cognitive dissonance theory dominated social psychology from the 1950s until the 1970s. It
revolutionized thinking about psychological processes, particularly regarding how actions and out-
comes affect attitudes or how behavior and motivation affect perception and cognition. The most
influential and widely cited classic experiments are “the post-decision dissonance” (Brehm, 1956),
“the induced/forced compliance” (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Freedman, 1965) and “the effort
justification” (Aronson and Mills, 1959).
Brehm (1956) examined dissonance theory in post-decision process. In the experiment, partic-
ipants were asked to make either an easy or a difficult choice between two alternatives. The easy
choice was one in which one alternative was much more attractive than the other, whereas the diffi-
cult choice was one in which the alternatives are very close in attractiveness. Participants were also
asked to evaluate the decision option both before and after the choice decision. According to the
theory, after a decision, all of the cognitions that favor the chosen item were consonance, while all
the cognitions that favor the rejected item were dissonance. Dissonance could be reduced by viewing
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the chosen alternative as more attractive and/or viewing the rejected alternative as less attractive.
Brehm found that after people made a difficult decision, they changed their attitudes to become
more negative toward the rejected alternative, whereas after an easy decision, their attitudes were
not changed.
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) hypothesized that dissonance should be aroused when a person
acts in a way that is contrary to his or her attitudes. To test this, participants were asked to
perform a boring task and then were paid either $1 (low justification) or $20 (high justification)
to tell another participant that the task was interesting. Since $20 provided sufficient justification
for the counter attitude behavior, according to the theory, lying for a payment of $1 should arouse
more dissonance than for $20. As expected, participants in low justification group ($1) changed
their attitudes to become more positive toward the task; however, those in high justification group
($20) did not change their attitudes and rated the activity boring as before.
Aronson and Mills (1959) designed the first experiment to test the effort justification idea. The
idea said dissonance was aroused whenever a person engaged in an unpleasant activity to obtain some
desirable outcome. The greater the unpleasant effort required to obtain the outcome, the greater
the dissonance. Dissonance could be reduced by exaggerating the desirability of the outcome, since
this would add consonant cognitions. In their experiment, women participants needed to undergo
a severe or mild “initiation” to become a group member. In the severe initiation condition, women
engaged in an embarrassing activity to join the group. In the mild condition however, women
engaged only in a simple activity that is not very embarrassing. The group was made dull and
boring. But women in the severe condition evaluated the group much more favorably than those in
the mild condition, which supported the effort justification idea.
For more innovative experiments on cognitive dissonance, Aronson (1969) and Nisbett and Ross
(1999) provide good and comprehensive summaries. Besides these, since late 20th century, there
has been renewed interest in cognitive dissonance theory (Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Harmon-Jones
& Mills, 1999) and implicit influences on many other contemporary theories (Aronson, 1992). More
details regarding the origin and development, challenge and revision of cognitive dissonance theory
over the past 50 years could be found in Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2007).
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2.2.2 Confirmation Bias
Another motivational process that was found in line with cognitive dissonance is called confirmatory
bias. It is an error in information processing and belief update procedure, which refers to a tendency
of selectively collecting information to reinforce the initial belief. As testing of the behavior, disso-
nance research using a selective exposure paradigm has demonstrated that people are more willing
to examine materials that confirm their beliefs than materials that dispute their beliefs (Brock and
Balloun, 1967; Frey, 1986). Research using a belief disconfirmation paradigm has shown that when
people are exposed to information that challenges their beliefs, they often strengthen their original
beliefs (Batson, 1975; Burris, Harmon-Jones and Tarpley, 1997).
Rabin and Schrag (1999) summarize 3 different information-processing problems that will lead to
confirmation bias. First, confirmatory bias arises when people have to interpret ambiguous evidence
(Keren (1987) and Griffin and Tversky (1992)). A series of experiments in psychology reveal that
people tend to misread evidence as additional support for initial beliefs. When facing the same
ambiguous information, people with different initial beliefs can move their beliefs even farther apart.
Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) tested this polarization phenomenon. In the experiment, subjects
were divided into 2 groups based on their earlier attitudes on death penalty and its deterrent effect.
After reading a few randomly selected studies and criticisms on this topic, the subjects were asked to
rate their change of attitude. Results showed that the proponents reported they were more in favor
of the penalty and its deterrent effect, whereas the opponents reported they were even less in favor
of the punishment and the efficacy. Lord, Ross and Lepper explained this as a biased assimilation
process which may include “a propensity to remember the strengths of confirming evidence but
the weaknesses of the disconfirming evidence, to judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable
but disconfirming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence while
scrutinizing disconfirming evidence”. However, Lord-Ross-Lepper experiment permits an alternative
explanation: Since the two groups of people may be predisposed to interpret ambiguous evidence
differently, the polarization that proves the difference in interpretation appears to be less relevant
to the current beliefs, and thus does not reflect confirmation bias. Darley and Gross (1983) provides
a similar but more direct test of polarization based on differing beliefs induced by two ex ante
identical groups, and excludes this alternative explanation.
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A second situation that may result in confirmatory bias occurs when people must interpret
statistical evidence to assess the correlation between phenomena that are separated by time (i.e.
hyperactivity and sugar intake, arthritis pain and weather change). Research suggests that inability
to identify such correlation is one of the most robust shortcomings in human reasoning (Nisbett and
Ross (1980)). Illusory correlation may play an important role in confirmatory bias. People either
underestimate the true correlation when they do not perceive it or overestimate some imaginary
correlation when they think it is true (Jennings, Amadibile and Ross (1982)).
Third, confirmatory bias can result from people selectively collecting or scrutinizing evidence.
A simpler version of selection bias is provided in Wason (1968). In the study, subjects were shown 4
cards with “E”, “4”, “K” and “7” on each card, and told that each card has a number on one side and
a letter on the other. The subjects were then asked which card should be turned over in order to test
the hypothesis that “every card with a vowel on one side has an even number on the other”. Most
subjects chose “E” and “4”. While choosing “E” could provide either confirming or disconfirming
results depending on whether the number on the other side is even or odd, turning “4” could only
provide confirming information if one finds a vowel and no information to test the hypothesis if a
consonant is found. In contrast, nearly nobody chose “7”. However, turning “7” could disprove the
hypothesis if a vowel is found. This is an illustration of individual’s willingness to select confirming
evidence and to shrink away from information that might disprove the prior hypothesis. A more
severe bias could happen when people experience hypothesis-based filtering, in which case, people
digest information according to their prior hypotheses and further use the consequent “filtered”
evidence as additional support for these hypotheses (Einhorn and Hogarth (1978), Klayman and Ha
(1987), Beattie and Baron (1988), Devine, Hirt and Gehrke (1990), Hodgins and Zuckerman (1993)
and Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins and Miyake (1995)). A trader who gets an unclear report of a stock
may try to understand it based on his previous impression about the stock. But he will fall into the
pitfall if he in turn uses the conclusion he derives from there as further evidence for his investment
decision.
Confirmatory bias was widely found in professional fields. Oskamp (1965) found that when
clinical psychologists tried to make decisions, their predictive accuracy reached a ceiling in some early
point in the information-gathering process. However, confidence about their decisions continued to
climb steadily as more information was obtained. Darley and Gross (1983) demonstrated teachers
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misread performance of pupils as supporting their initial impressions. Frank and Gilovich (1988)
found referees gave significantly more penalty to black-uniformed teams due to the impression that
black looked more aggressive. In business management, managers tend to persist with unsuccessful
policies (Staw (1976)) and CEOs are overconfident in their acquisition decisions (Bogan and Just
(2006)). In finance, traders biases towards early investment (empirical review, see Shleifer (2000)).
2.2.3 Consumer Behavior
Psychological biases such as cognitive dissonance and confirmatory bias have also been extensively
applied to consumer behavior. Several articles have provided critical reviews of the theories and
have described how the theories are related to consumer behavior (Kassarjian and Cohen, 1965;
Cummings and Venkatesan, 1976; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2007). Empirical research
generally falls into two categories: (1) effects of dissonance on attitude change and tendency to
repurchase, and (2) effects of dissonance on selective information seeking by consumers. In general,
studies which have examined the effects of dissonance on attitude change and tendency to repur-
chase have supported the predictions from the theory (Doob, Carlsmith, Freedman, Landauer and
Tom, 1969; Kassarjian and Cohen, 1965). By the foot-in-the-door technique, consumers who care
about consistency can make big commitment following a smaller one (Freedman and Fraser (1966)
and Pliner, Hart, Kohl and Saari (1974)). However, empirical findings have not supported either
a general preference for supportive over non-supportive information or a greater information seek-
ing/avoidance tendency by high dissonance subjects (Freedman and Sears, 1965; Ehrlich et al, 1957;
Engel, 1963; LoSciuto and Perloff, 1967). In the marketing situation, it cannot be concluded up to
this point that dissonance is relevant to post-decision information seeking. Recently, literature in
food safety and public health fill this gap to some extent. Wessells, Kline and Anderson (1996) used
survey data and shows consumers’ perceptions of seafood safety are influenced by their past expe-
riences. Further, the perceptions influence the anticipated changes in consumption under different
hypothetical information concerning seafood. Lin, Lee and Yen (2004) found in field that search for
fat and cholesterol information on food labels is less likely among individuals who consume more of
these nutrients and thus supports the selective information avoidance tendency that has not been
justified in marketing literature.
Research that will further contribute the field includes but not limits to the following directions.
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The first direction involves identification of different types of confirmatory bias mentioned above
and its impact on consumer risk perception and future behavior. In this study, the authors will
demonstrate the contingent existence of cognitive dissonance and individual’s tendency of interpret-
ing ambiguous signals to confirm current beliefs. This study will add some new insights concerning
consumer behavior in general and food safety framework in particular.
Second, few studies to date have examined the conditions under which dissonance will and will
not work. In another experimental setting, we differentiated consumers’ responses based on their
familiarities to the food they were dealing with and identified the condition under which dissonance
would occur (Cao and Just, 2009). This offered some explanations for why consumers were less
responsive to public information.
Moreover, most studies in the marketing field adopted the free-choice paradigm and argued
it was less possible to use forced compliance paradigm since consumers would not comply with
requests of buying sub-optimal goods whenever the best alternative was available. However, in the
food consumption situation, we could manipulate this by assigning participants to some certain
food, induce dissonance and investigate subsequent behaviors later on. This is also an innovative
part of the study compared with other existing research.
Finally, individual decision model that incorporates behavioral anomalies could be further refined
to better understand the preferences and utility gains. Many studies have offered fundamentals for
this. Rabin and Schrag (1999) models how individual interpret ambiguous information in favor of
current belief. Koszegi (1999) used dynamic model to capture the stopping rule in the information
seeking process. Yariv (2002) proposes a model that characterizes the taste of consistency, stickiness
in behavior and preference over signals. Moreover, in a normative perspective, mechanism designs
between behavioral decision maker, strategic information holder and rational social planner could
improve the equilibrium in the market interactive context. As of food safety issue, this could
rationalize labeling regulation and many other policy interventions regarding public health.
2.3 Experimental Design
This food choice experiment was conducted in fall 2007 at Cornell University (Ithaca, NY). The
experiment was designed to measure the actual response of participants to ambiguous signals of food.
The weight of food consumed by each participant was recorded and the feeling, expectation and
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perception of the food were asked afterwards. We focused on the interaction between participants’
past eating behaviors, current risk perceptions and future information processing procedures. Even
though the common observation suggests that individuals overestimate the probability of rare events
(i.e. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), research about food choices also reports that consumers tend to
underestimate the risk of food-borne illnesses (Hayes et al., 1995). This experimental methodology
and the results provide us with an explanation for the underestimation of risk.
In this lunchtime experiment, participants were placed in a situation where they were required
to choose whether or not to eat chicken that might be tainted. We considered 2 by 2 conditions
with a total of four different cases. First, participants were randomly assigned to two treatment
groups. In one group, we mixed the chicken with fish sauce. The fish sauce gave a very strong smell
and served as some ambiguous signal that the food was potentially tainted. In the other group, the
participants were offered the normal chicken dish. In both treatment groups, chicken was delivered
by a popular local processor, called Ithaca Wings. Further, within each group, participants were
categorized by users and non-users, depending on whether they had previous experience of eating
the food from the local processor.
We hypothesized generally that while individuals would reduce their consumption when facing
some strange signals indicating the food being potentially contaminated, they would not cease
to consume altogether. This hypothesis is in line with most of the food psychology literature
which suggested that individuals have a very hard time resisting food that is immediately available
(Boon et al, 1998; Cornell, Rodin and Weingarten, 1989) or that has already been purchased
and currently in present within the household (Chandon and Wansink, 2002). In other word, a
taste of consistency may cause stickiness in behavior when individuals are making food choice
decisions. Further, consumers may be different in sensitivity to the signal due to their previous
eating experiences. For this reason, we hypothesized users would sense the strangeness of the food
with a higher probability than non-users in the first place. However, the sensitivity would decrease
as the participants eat more chicken. This hypothesis is driven from cognitive consistency and
confirmatory bias that have been widely found in fields. Subjects would first update their beliefs
to be consistent with their previous behaviors and then selectively collect and interpret signals as
supporting evidence for their beliefs.
Participants in the experiment were recruited for a “food marketing study”, and promised $5
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and a meal for their participation. Each session took place at 12:30pm on a Tuesday, Wednesday
or Thursday. Subjects were directly informed that the experiment would be conducted by a food
psychologist who is a member of the applied economics faculty and that the experiments were not
associated with the experimental economics laboratory. Participants entered a room featuring a
buffet line to their left and a set of three long tables (seating up to 20 persons each) arranged in
a “U” shape on their right. Participants were asked to enter the buffet line and select as much as
they liked of each of the foods: boneless fried chicken tenders, French fries, pudding, apple sauce,
celery, macaroni salad, soda and bottled water. Subjects were instructed to take at least a little
of each item, and each item was to be placed on a separate small plate on their tray. At the
end of the buffet line, all plates were weighted individually, and participants were then told to be
seated at one of the three long tables on the outer edge of the “U” and to wait for instruction from
the experimenter before beginning to eat. By sitting on the outside of the “U”, each individual
could easily see and hear all of the other participants. After the experimenter checked each tray to
make sure everyone had complied with instructions, the subjects began eating. After completing
their meals, the participants’ plate were again weighted to determine how much of each item had
been consumed. Each subject was then asked to respond to a survey. Following completing the
survey, participants were asked to discuss their experiment with the experimenter and provide their
impressions.
2.4 Experimental Results
2.4.1 Summary Statistics and Treatment Groups
A total of 61 participants completed the experiment. Summary statistics could be found in Table
1. As shown in the table, we had a good control over age and the body mass index (BMI), however,
the two treatment groups are slightly different in gender, height and weight, with fish sauce group
having more female and thus, lower height and weight measures than the non fish sauce group. In
later analysis, we controlled these factors and the further robustness check ensured that our main
results do not change with these issues.
Each group was further decomposed based on participants’ responses to the question “how many
times did you eat at Wings (the local processor)”. Those who reported non-zero visiting time were
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called (experienced) users. And others who had no previous experience eating at Wings were called
(inexperienced) non-users. 15 out of 28 participants in the fish sauce group were categorized as users
and 17 out of 33 in the non fish sauce group were users. Since we focused on the interaction between
behavior, perception and information processing, this way of organizing participants enabled us the
most flexibility to test our hypotheses. While fish sauce served as an ambiguous signal of the food
being potentially tainted, we still expected different sensitivities and responses to the signals due
to different past experiences.
Several questions were asked as manipulation check for the fish sauce treatment and the division
of user and non-user. In response to the question “I ate more chicken than usual”, fish sauce group
reported a significant decrease (an average difference of 1.8 out of 9-point scale, F=13.64, P=0.00).
For “the chicken tastes better than usual”, participants in non fish sauce group reported higher rates
(F=8.64, P=0.00). More participants in fish sauce group agreed with the statement “the chicken
didn’t’ taste quite right” (F=9.19, P=0.00). For all the questions above, there was no significant
difference between users and non-users, which implied our division of group is independent between
each other. In order to check the correctness of users and non-users, we further asked questions
such as “how many times did you eat carryout from Wings”, “how many times did you eat last year
at Wings” and “when is the last time you ate at Wings” etc. All the results were consistent with
the ones from the original question “how many times did you eat at Wings”. Once again, checking
the responses to these questions, there was no significant difference due to the fish sauce treatment
and the independence was verified.
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2.4.2 Behavior
In order to investigate the impact of past behavior on perception and dissonance feeling, variables
were organized as different stages in the cognitive procedure. We started with a group of measures
called “Behavior”, which included the amount of food taken, remaining and eaten and the percentage
of the food eaten by each individual. The amount of food eaten was then used as control over the
intensity of the behavioral impact, with more food eaten representing stronger behavior. The second
group of variables “Perception” measured the general feelings, such as how tasty the chicken was,
how high the quality was, did the chicken taste right or tainted and the expectation of the last piece
eaten, etc. The third group “Dissonance” further linked the feelings with potential food safety risk
(i.e. birdflu), and measured how individual felt about the risk and their judgments on the related
issues. The last group “Future Behavior” elicited the participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) based
on their past eating behaviors and their influenced risk perceptions.
Table 2 gave the food choice behavior between groups. On average, people took 150.35 grams of
chicken and ate 127.85 grams. For the fish sauce effect, in general, people ate less when the chicken
was mixed with fish sauce (F=8.16, P=0.00). This trend could also be found separately in both user
group (125.5 vs. 154.75) and the non-user group (87.82 vs. 154.2, F=7.64, P=0.01), even though
the difference in the user group is not significant. This finding was consistent with our hypothesis
that when the food was a little bit strange, consumers would decrease their consumption, but would
not stop eating it altogether. For the user effect, users ate slightly more than non users (138.04 vs.
118.94). Comparing choices between groups, in the fish sauce group, users took and ate significantly
more chicken than the non-users (F=3.48, P=0.07), but in the non fish sauce group, users and non-
users were not different from each other significantly (F=0.00, P=0.98). This phenomenon could
be explained in this way: Experience did not play much role when the food was normal (as in the
non fish sauce group); But as the condition of the food changed (as in the fish sauce group), users
had higher tolerance to the conditions of the food due to their past experiences.
Since chicken eaten may also be influenced by risk perceptions and feelings in the first place,
we need to find instrument variables for eating behavior, predict it and make the predicted value
being independent of previous perceptions and feelings. There are three groups of variables that can
serve as instruments: First, exogenous treatments, i.e. fish sauce and user indicators are determined
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Table 2: Study 1_Food Choice Behavior by Group
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independent of individual psychological feelings, but will influence eating behaviors. Second, the
amount of food taken at the beginning of the experiment, which indicate subjects’ hungry level, are
considered independent of emotional feelings, as well. In addition, other types of food available in
the buffet line can be used as substitutes of the main dish - chicken. Finally, demographics such as
age, gender, BMI can have impacts on eating behavior but not on risk feelings.
Table 3 reported regression results about eating behavior on 4 different combinations of instru-
ments. In general, adding fish sauce to the chicken entree decreased eating amount by roughly 20
grams. Whether a subject had previous consumption experience or not (User or Non-user) does not
significantly impact eating amount. Subjects ate about 78% of chicken they took from the buffet
line. However, the amount of side dishes eaten, i.e. French fries, pudding, macaroni salad, celery
and apply sauce, do not have any significant impact on chicken eaten. Further, effect of demographic
variables are not significant either.
In the following context, use the regression in the first column of Table 3 to predict chicken
eaten, and use the predicted value (which is now independent of risk perceptions) as explanatory
variable to investigate effects of eating behavior on perceptions and feelings. In the tables that
follows (i.e. Table-4 to 7), variable Chickeaten is the predicted value.
2.4.3 Perception
Table 4 listed a few measures of perceptions and their changing patterns with the eating behav-
iors. Each column represented a perception measure, with individuals’ agreement in a 9-point scale.
Regressing each of the perception measures on the treatment dummies fish sauce and user, and be-
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Table 3: Study 1_Instrument for Behavior
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havior variables chicken eaten, in addition to the interaction terms between fish sauce and chicken
eaten (FsChick), and user and chicken eaten (UseChick), table-3 recorded all the estimated param-
eters for each perception. Based on the results, participants could sense the fish sauce treatment
correctly in the first place, but their perceptions were influenced in an opposite way as they ate
more chicken. For example, for the statement “the chicken is very tasty” (Chicken2 ), people in fish
sauce group reported 2.78 points lower than those in the non fish sauce group, but as they ate more
chicken, their agreement to this statement was increasing with an additional slope of 0.0157. Simi-
larly, participants behaved the same trend for other statement like “the chicken is of high quality”
(Chicken3 ), “the chicken is better than typical” (Chicken4 ) and “the expectation of the last piece of
chicken you ate” (Expect2 ), etc. In contrary, for some statement regarding the negative perception of
the food, such as “the chicken doesn’t taste quite right” (Chicken5 ) and “the chicken tastes tainted”
(Chicken6 ), participants in fish sauce group on average reported a higher agreement in the constant
term (3.34 and 2.32 respectively), but an additional lower slope (-0.0156 and -0.0114) implying that
the more they ate, the less negatively they rated the food. These findings suggested that people did
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Table 4: Study 1_Impact of Food Choice on Perception
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feel cognitive dissonance and confirmatory bias. On the one hand, eating chicken with fish sauce
made them feel that the food w s somewhat strange. This raised a dissonance feeling in their mind
as oppose to their cognition that they always ate something safe. On the other hand, individuals
would have a tendency to reduce the dissonance feeling. The more they ate the more dissonance
they felt, the stronger the tendency was. Since people could not change their past eating behavior,
the only way feasible for them to reduce the dissonance was to perceive the food in a more favorable
way. And this is just what we found in the data.
2.4.4 Dissonance
A further investigation of the dissonance measures showed that even though people perceived some
objective characteristics of the food in a right way (Table 4), they still performed biases when
making judgment involving risk. In table 5, the (hypothetical) statement “the chicken is partially
infected with bird flu” (Birdflu6 ) was tested. Similar as before, users still reported a higher rate
(1.41) than non users, implying that previous experience enabled them to be more sensitive. But
once again, the amount of the food eaten had an opposite effect on the judgment. For each 1 more
gram of chicken they ate, the users lowered their level of agreement by 0.008. Given the fact that
on average, people ate more than 150 grams, this effect was large enough to offset their original
sensitivity (the 1.41 points higher in the constant term). Further, fish sauce treatment had an
additional negative effect of 1.43, which means that in fish sauce group, people were even more
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Table 5: Study 1_Impact of Food Choice on Dissonance
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reluctant to admit the food was partially infecte .
Moreover, the amount of food eaten also had significant positive impact on the judgment such as
“I didn’t believe it (bird flu) would hurt me” (Because7 ) and “the food was safe” (Because10 ). The
statements “I ate chicken because I am hungry” (Because4 ) and “I usually eat what’s in front of me”
(Because5 ) could be used as arguments to justify previous eating behaviors to some extent. And
for these, the amount of food eaten also had the same effect. The more participants ate, the higher
the desire they wanted to justify. Regarding “I ate chicken because it was a study” (Because9 ), even
though one could observe significant effects, the interpretation could be a bit ambiguous.
2.4.5 Future Behavior
In addition to the perceptions and dissonance feelings, variables regarding future behaviors were
also collected. First, participants were asked about their WTP for the whole meal (Limit). Table
6 shows the results. While fish sauce decreased the users’ WTP by $1.88 (close to be significant,
t=-1.45), it did not have strong effect for non-users. The amount of food eaten increased the WTP
of the users, but once again had no effect on non-users. Comparing the fish sauce treatment effect
and the effect of eating amount (marginal effect on the slope term), one could observe that among
users, the slope effect could overweight the treatment effect, given that on average, people ate 150
grams chicken. Though users can sense the strangeness about the food, they lose their clue as eating
more.
The participants were also given a chance to trade their $5 payment to a larger amount in gift
certificates redeemable for food at Wings over Ithaca, the local processor which offered the food in
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Table 6: Study 1_Impact of Food Choice on Future Behavior
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If yes, they were then asked to pick an integer number that they would be willing to trade ranging
from $5 to $20 (Trade1 ). Then a 16-sided die with sides numbered 5 to 20 was rolled. If the roll
was greater than the amount the participant picked, he/she would be given the amount of the roll
in gift certificate. If the roll is less than his/her willingness to accept, he/she would still keep the $5
in cash. General hypothesis would be people chose to trade if they liked the food. Given they chose
to trade, people would be willing to claim for lower amount in gift certificate if they liked the food
more. Moreover, by the design of the game, people would make trade-off between the amount they
were willing to accept and the possibility they could win. If a participant valued $1 certificate to
be the same as $1 in cash, he/she should claimed for $9, which was the optimal choice considering
the trade-off. However, in the experiment, on average, users claimed for about $10.5 and non-users
claimed for $13.4, both higher than $9. This implied participants valued $1 in gift certificate less
than $1 in cash, which was normal.
44 out of 61 participants chose to trade, among whom 23 were users (with 11 in fish sauce
group and 12 in non fish sauce group) and 21 were non users (with 11 in fish sauce group and 10
in non fish sauce group). Regression of willingness amount to trade (Trade1) in Table 6 suggested
non-users were more possible to be impacted by the eating behaviors. The more they ate, the higher
the amount their willingness to accept was. Users’ choices didn’t bear the same effect from eating
behaviors. (Column under “All, Trade1 ”) Tobit model with data censored between 5 and 20 gave
the same results as OLS regression. Further, the amount of chicken eaten positively impacted the
possibility to trade (Trade0 ) among non-users (Column “User=0, Trade0 ”). As the participants
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ate more chicken, it was more likely for them to choose to trade the $5 cash for a larger amount
of gift certificate, implying a taste of consistency among consumers, especially when they were new
customers. Further, given participants chose to trade, non-users tended to claim almost $3 higher
than users (Columns “If Trade, Trade1”). Lack of previous experiences among non-users could be
an explanation for this gap.
2.5 Discussion
This study suggested consumers had a taste of consistency in choosing what to eat and would be
subject to confirmatory bias when making judgments. When facing an ambiguous signal about the
food quality, consumers were more likely to neglect the signal and rate the food as more favorable
if they ate more. Even though consumers who had previous experience with the food would notice
the signal with a higher probability, their judgments were also mitigated by a larger magnitude
depending on the amount they ate before. This finding offered an explanation for why consumers
were universally irresponsive to the public food safety information. Non-users might overlook the
food safety issue due to inexperience. But the users could also misperceive the potential risk so as
to justify their previous eating behavior and reduce the dissonance feelings in their mind.
A few caveats need to be pointed here. First, we did have significant difference in gender,
height and weight across groups. But the main results did not change when the demographics were
included in the model.
Second, as shown in Table 7 47.5% of the non-users and 31.25% of the users in the fish sauce
group ate all of the chicken, which were slightly lower than the percentage in the non fish sauce
group (54% of the participants ate all the chicken). Of all those participating in the experiment,
only 2 out of 33 (6%) in the fish sauce group refused to eat any of the chicken they had taken.
On the one hand, people would decrease eating amount when facing ambiguous signals and the
amount decreased depend on their previous experiences. On the other hand, very few would cease
to eat the chicken altogether. In terms of policy concern, some existing estimation of the changes
in consumption due to food safety issues might be exaggerated in the field. Given the behavioral
pattern found in this study, substantial efforts would be needed to fully eliminate consumption
changes when food is recalled.
For the experimental design, since there was no other meat immediately available, participants
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Table 7: Study 1_Participants Consuming None, Some and All of the Chicken by Group
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might have eaten some chicken when they otherwise would have avoided. Future work could address
this potential interaction with substitutes by adding more choices of main dish in addition to the
side dishes (i.e. French Fries and pudding, etc).
Moreover, the food served in the study was delivered by a local restaurant right before con-
sumption, thus, the level of consumption might reflect an inherent trust that a food retailer would
not provide tainted food due to liability concerns. Even though without the local food processor,
participants’ eating behaviors might also to some extent reflect their original perceptions regarding
the food. Being unable to tease out those effects would yield potentially biased results. This study
chose 4 groups of instrumental variables to address this problem.
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3 Chapter 3
Study 2: Cognitive Dissonance, Confirmation Bias and Inadequate
Information Processing
3.1 Introduction
Psychological biases such as cognitive dissonance and confirmatory bias have been extensively ap-
plied to consumer behavior. Empirical research generally falls into two categories: (1) effects of
dissonance on attitude change and tendency to repurchase, and (2) effects of dissonance on selec-
tive information seeking by consumers. In general, studies along the first line have supported the
predictions from the theory (Doob, Carlsmith, Freedman, Landauer and Tom, 1969; Kassarjian
and Cohen, 1965). However, empirical findings have not supported either a general preference for
supportive over non-supportive information or a greater information seeking/avoidance tendency
by high dissonance subjects (Freedman and Sears, 1965; Ehrlich et al, 1957; Engel, 1963; LoSciuto
and Perloff, 1967).
Recently, literature in food choices and public health fills this gap to some extent. Wessells,
Kline and Anderson (1996) uses survey data and shows consumers’ perceptions of seafood safety
are influenced by their past experiences. Further, the perceptions influence the anticipated changes
in consumption under different hypothetical information concerning seafood. Lin, Lee and Yen
(2004) finds in field that search for fat and cholesterol information on food labels is less likely
among individuals who consume more of these nutrients and thus supports the selective information
avoidance tendency.
Some general critiques for the above research are: First, most studies fail to establish an ex-
clusive relationship between their results and the theory. Second, endogeneity problem among risk,
perception and behavior may further bias the result (Shogren and Stamland, 2007). With these
concerns, an incentive compatible experimental design can have the advantage of isolating alterna-
tive competing interpretations and identifying the causal relationship accurately. Relevant designs
in the previous literature include two major directions: food safety preference and valuation (such
as Hayes et al, 1995) and informational impact on consumer behavior (such as Lusk et al, 2004a).
The objective of this study is to investigate the following research questions: First, how does
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individual consumer react to information regarding food safety issue in general? Second, what are
the psychological factors that may affect consumers’ responses to the information? Third, if the
psychological factors exist, to what extent do they affect the decision-making? And fourth, how
to mediate the factors that impact consumers’ rational decision making so as to make the public
communication more effective?
In order to make clear the above questions, a two-group between-subject experiment was con-
ducted. In the study, participants were instructed to bid for chocolate candy bars with 3 different
flavors through BDM (Becker-Degroot-Marschak) auction. The auction lasted for 3 rounds. Afla-
toxin food safety information was provided to the participants at the beginning of the second and
the third round. Of all the 3 flavors, peanut flavor was highly related to the food-borne illness,
followed by almond flavor, and plain flavor did not get involved in the food safety issue in the study.
For all the 3 rounds, risk perceptions and bids were collected. The only difference between control
and treatment group was that participants bid for all 3 flavors and randomly got one flavor to be
binding in the control group, whereas participants in the treatment group freely chose one out of
the 3 flavor to bid at the very beginning.
Results showed that as soon as participants made their free choice, they bid higher prices for
the candy bars. The result was robust when the factors such as risk perception and preference were
controlled. This result suggested consumers experienced cognitive dissonance after committing to
one product and the higher bids was used as self-compliance device to justify their previous choices.
Further, when participants were exposed to safety information involving the products they
chose, though risk perceptions increased, the changing magnitude in the treatment group was much
lower than that of control group. As a natural tendency to reduce dissonance feelings, consumers
selectively ignored conflicting (risk) information and behaved with confirmatory bias. In terms of
market responses, the demand curves were less likely to shift downwards after the risk information
shock. While loyal customers were more tolerant to negative news regarding their favorite products,
they were also less sensible in picking up crucial information when health or food safety issues were
involved.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the experimental design used
to test consumer behaviors. In the meantime, testing hypotheses are linked to the measures in the
experiment. Section 3.3 presents results of the study. Causal inference, robustness and manipulation
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check are also performed in this section. Section 3.4 provides discussion of the paper.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Treatments and Experimental Procedure
This study used a between-subject experiment design. Grocery shoppers were recruited through
existing mailing list of staff members at Cornell University and were guaranteed with $10 for partic-
ipation. Experiment was conducted on an individual basis. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly
assigned to 1 of 2 groups. In the control group, the subjects were invited to bid for 3 food items
with different flavors but otherwise identical for 3 rounds consecutively, and were told 1 out of
the 9 bids would be randomly chosen to be implemented at the end. In the treatment group, the
subjects were invited to freely choose 1 flavor out of the 3 otherwise identical food items to bid for
3 consecutive rounds and were told 1 out of the 3 bids would be randomly chosen to be binding at
the end. Table 8 provided a brief list of the experimental procedure for both control and treatment
groups. A detailed procedure for each group was described as follows.
For the control group, as subjects walked into the room, they were told the experimenter was
interested in consumer’s food preference and evaluation. Subjects were each guaranteed $10 for
completing the study. Subjects were also told the study involved non-hypothetical auctions for food
items and based upon their bids and 2 lottery results, they had a chance to win one of the food items
and pay the corresponding price. The procedure of the auction was then explained to subjects and a
hypothetical practice round using a small piece of stationary (a small pack of BIC sticky notes) was
conducted to make sure subjects understand the auction procedure. Subjects were also instructed
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that they could ask the experimenter if there were any questions or concerns, but they were not
allowed to talk to each other or share results or bids.
After going through a hypothetical practice auction using a non-food item and making sure
subjects were clear about how the auction worked, the experimenter brought subjects to the real
auction. 3 food items were presented and subjects were told that the whole auction involved making
bids for the 3 food items in 3 rounds. In order to encourage subjects to be serious in making all 9
bids, a friendly reminder was given before they made any bid. The reminder said the auction for
each item in each round worked in the same way as in the practice session and all of the 9 auctions
were equally likely to be chosen and implemented. It was to the participant’s benefit to treat each
auction seriously as if it was the one that would determine final payoffs.
In each bidding round, subjects were asked 3 pairs of questions, one pair for each food item.
The first question asked about food safety risk perception for the particular food item (“What do
you think is the risk that people getting sick from eating XXX – the food item, where 1 means no
risk at all and 10 means absolute risk?”). The second question is willingness to pay for the food
item. Subjects were instructed to choose “Yes” (willing to) or “No” (not willing to) to purchase the
food item at each of 10 listed prices, ranging from $0.10 to $1.00 with increment of $0.10. Within
each round, the order of bidding items were randomized in order to control for order effects on
bidding behavior. Round 2 and 3 were conducted the same way as in round 1, except that before
these two rounds, qualitative and quantitative information sessions regarding food safety risk and
some food-borne pathogen were given to subjects. The content and details of the information were
discussed in the next subsection.
When subjects finished their bids for all 3 rounds, the experimenter offered two lotteries to
each subject. The first lottery (chips numbered from 1 to 9) determined which of the 9 bids was
implemented. The second lottery (chips numbered from 1 to 10) determined the final price of the
bidding item. Based upon bids and lottery results, subjects were then told individually whether
they won the auction and if yes, what their final payoffs should be. Subjects were asked to finish
a survey before they could get monetary payoffs. The survey included questions such as preference
of the food items, eating habits, current sense of hunger, previous knowledge and awareness of
food safety issues, risk perceptions and demographics such as age, gender, income and household
composition, etc. Upon completion, subjects got their monetary settlements and the experiment
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ended.
For treatment group, the procedure was the same as the control group except the auction rounds.
In the treatment group, instead of bidding for all 3 listed food items, subjects were told to freely
choose 1 food item out of the 3 to bid for 3 rounds. But same as in the control group, whenever
the 3 listed food items came together in the instruction or choice options, the order of the 3 was
randomized across subjects so as to control for order effects. A reminder was given to subjects that
once they made their choice, they would bid only for the item they chose and would only have a
chance to win the chosen item. In this case, in each bidding round, subjects were only asked 1 pair
of questions regarding the chosen item. First was the risk perception and second was the willingness
to pay. Same pieces of information (i.e. qualitative and quantitative) were provided before round 2
and round 3. Lottery choices were still used to determine final payoffs. The only difference was in
the first lottery; chips numbered from 1 to 9 indicated 3 rounds rather than 9 separate bids, with 1
to 3 representing round 1, 4 to 6 representing round 2 and 7 to 9 representing round 3. Survey was
also given to subjects before they could get monetary payoffs and ended the session.
3.2.2 Food Items, Information and Dissonance Inducing
The essential part in this study was to induce dissonance feelings and investigate consumers’ be-
havioral responses. In addition to free choice (Treatment) and random assignment (Control) of
bidding items, other critical conditions to induce dissonance are similarity among choice options
and availability of conflicting information.
Chocolate candy bars, which were different only in flavors but otherwise identical, were used as
bidding items in the study. The three different flavors were plain/original, peanuts and almonds.
There were three major reasons or concerns in choosing bidding food items for the study. First,
the items needed to be highly identical to one another with only one trivially different attribute
(Different flavors in this study). In this sense, it was easier to make external intervention to the trivial
attribution so as to induce dissonance feelings, while at the same time excluding all other potential
compound impacts. Subjects in the treatment group picked their bidding items by preference or by
some temporary and unconscious decisions. Exogenously offering food safety information regarding
some of the flavors/food items afterwards induced dissonance feelings among those who chose the
corresponding items. More discussion about the information is provided in the next few paragraphs
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in this section.
Second, the selected food items were common and tempting in general. On the one hand, using
food items that were commonly seen in the real life yielded results that could be easily generalized
to most food purchase and consumption situations. One caveat was to choose common food items
but less common brand names, since popular brands with high reputation were normally believed
to be free of food safety issues and hence, could potentially impede the induction of dissonance
feelings. On the other hand, choosing food items that were tempting enough attracted subjects and
made them to be willing to bid some money on the food in the experiment, especially when it was
the snack time in the middle or late afternoon. The changes in bidding behaviors and reactions to
information driven by temptation and dissonance feelings could also provide implication for public
health and food safety regulation.
Third, big gap between wholesale price and retail price was another merit. Large variation in
price made subjects feel free to bid within the range so as to capture changings in risk perception,
preference and feelings in the study. At the same time, since the large price range also exist in the
real life, the subjects wouldn’t feel it was too unrealistic to bid so differently across products and
section rounds.
In addition to the selection of food items, providing conflicting information was another crucial
part of the design. In this study, aflatoxin food-borne pathogen was selected. First of all, it was not
so widely familiar to the public as other pathogens such as semolina or E. coli, etc. Subjects would
be tested for their reactions in according to their self-reported individual awareness or knowledge
of the pathogen. Secondly, food items were involved with different levels of aflatoxin risk. Among
the selected food items in the study, peanut flavor candy bars were the ones with highest risk of
aflatoxin, and almond flavor had the second highest risk, while plain/original flavor was generally
believed to be free from the risk. Special attention would be given to the interaction between the
choice of food items and the nature of risk involved. Lastly, aflatoxin was highly associated with corn
and nut products, which took a substantial proportion of common foods. Testing public responses
to pathogen of this type could generate rich policy implications.
During the experiment, food safety information was provided to subjects twice, once before bid-
ding in the second round and once before bidding in the third round. The first information sheet
included some general qualitative introduction about aflatoxin, how it was related to common food
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items and how it was related to human health and potential sickness, etc. In addition, peanut and
almond were pointed out to be highly relevant to this food-borne pathogen. In the second infor-
mation sheet, quantitative information about aflatoxin concentrations detected in different types of
products was provided. Comparisons were also made between peanut products and almond prod-
ucts. It was also made clear that whenever a product was detected with aflatoxin, concentrations in
peanut products were roughly 1000 times more than that in almond products. These two informa-
tion sessions were provided so as to induce dissonance feelings for those subjects who chose peanut
or almond candy bars in the treatment group. Information was designed to be general and vague in
the first session and was designed to be more clear and standardized in the second session . Impact
of dissonance feelings, effectiveness of information and potential spillover effects can then be tested
for both immediately related food items (peanut and almond candy bars) and indirectly involved
item (plain flavor bars).
3.2.3 Auction Mechanism
In order to hold participants’ decisions accountable, incentive-compatible auction mechanism was
used in the study. In general, experimental auction has the advantage of putting participants in a
situation with real goods and real money. Moreover, consumption requirement in the experiment
would force individuals to put cognitive efforts into their bidding decisions (Fox et al, 1995). In
particular, the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism was adopted here.
The BDM is a popular value elicitation mechanism, but it is not an auction per se as subjects
do not bid against one another in a market environment. However, the fundamental logic is same
as other auction mechanisms. With the BDM, a person submits a bid and purchases the good if
his bid is greater than some randomly drawn price.
Other auction mechanisms that are commonly used in practice are English auction, 2nd price
auction and (random) nth price auction. In brief, English auction is the most familiar mechanism
to the general population, where people offer ascending bids until only one participant remains.
The person wins the auction and purchases the good at the last offered bid amount. In 2nd price
auction, subjects submits sealed bids, the highest bidder wins the auction and pays the 2nd highest
bid. The nth price auction is a generalization of 2nd price auction, where people submit sealed
bids and the (n-1) highest bidders win the auction and pay the nth highest bid amount. Random
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nth price auction differs in the sense that the cutting rank n is randomly drawn, rather than being
predetermined.
In principle, these auctions mechanisms yield bids equal to the true values and thus are equally
efficient in eliciting preference and valuation. In practice, however, certain mechanism will have
some relative advantages in certain context. The choice of mechanism for a specific study depends
upon the particular purpose and the context.
In the induced value experiment setting, on average, the 2nd price and the nth price auction are
more accurate than the BDM. In particular, 2nd price auction works better on-margin (i.e. for people
with valuation near the market price), and the random nth price auction works better off-margin
(i.e. for people with valuations far from the market price). The 2nd and nth price auctions have
advantages when estimating the demand curve with market interactions among bidders (Shogren
et al, 2001; Noussair et al; 2004 and Lusk and Rousu, 2006).
In the homegrown value experiment setting, however, all auction mechanisms tend to yield
similar mean bids in the initial rounds, with 2nd price auction overbidding and nth price auction
underbidding in the later rounds (Lusk et al, 2004b), suggesting an order effect and affiliation (peer
effect). The BDM and English auction in general generate similar bids in all rounds (Rutstrom,
1998).
Further, BDM is the only mechanism that could be performed on an individual basis that does
not require a group of subjects. It has been proved to be useful for eliciting values in field setting
such as grocery stores (Lusk et al, 2001; Rousu et al, 2005). In this sense, BDM fits the purpose of
this study best. A few considerations that need to be taken into account when conducting BDM are:
First, lack of active market environment might be crucial in inducing economic rationality at the
margin or at the individual level if arbitrage has enough power. Second, the WTP/WTA disparity
that disappears in active market environment will still exist in the BDM. Third, the distribution
for the random price generator needs to be chosen very carefully. It should be large enough (so that
the bids will not be censored) but with limited range (so that reasonable bids have enough chance
of winning), and still easier to be conveyed to the participants.
Specific to the BDM auction in this study, the procedure had been designed carefully to avoid
the potential problems above. First, the nature of this study was not elicit the true market price
for certain food items, but was to investigate the changings in valuations across rounds due to
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some psychological biases. Hence, active market environment and on/off margin consumers were
less important concerns. Further, the study was designed as one-side transaction, which was to let
subjects make bids and purchase the food item when they won. So, there should not be any chance
for arbitrage. Second, as mentioned earlier, since the interest of this study was the changes in the
valuation across rounds and by the design, only the WTP was used, hence, the WTP/WTA disparity
was irrelevant here. Third, careful instructions were made to the subjects before the auction and a
hypothetical practice round was performed before the real auction for food items so as to make sure
subjects understand the whole auction mechanism. The price range and random price generator
device were also well controlled in the study to ensure 50% chances to win by expectation. More
discussion was included in the result section.
To be more detailed, during the auction procedure, as subjects arrived for the study, they were
told the purpose of this study was to investigate consumers’ valuation of certain foods via auction
mechanisms. The following auction procedure was then explained to them.
“Here is how the auction will proceed:
1. First, you will indicate your willingness to pay for the auction item by circling “Yes” or “No”
for EACH price listed on the bid sheet. NOTE: If you choose “Yes” at a certain price, your
choices for all other prices lower than this price should also be “Yes”. In contrast, if you
choose “No” at a certain price, your choices for all other prices higher than this price should
also be “No”. The ONLY price that makes you switch from “Yes” to “No” is the MOST you
are willing to pay for the item.
2. Then, the experimenter will randomly draw a number, 1 through 10; each indicates a corre-
sponding price on your bid sheet. For example, if we draw the number 1, the price indicated
is the 1st price on the list. In this case, it is $0.10. Importantly, all prices are equally likely
to be drawn.
3. If your choice at the randomly drawn price is “Yes”, then you win the auction, purchase the
item at the price equal to the randomly drawn price.
4. If your choice at the randomly drawn price is “No”, then you do NOT win the item.”
The subjects were instructed first to indicate their willingness to pay for the bidding food item by
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choosing “Yes” or “No” for each of 10 prices listed on the bidding sheet. The price ranged from $0.1
to $1, with increment of $0.1. A special explanation was given to subjects that there should be only
one switching price from “Yes” to “No”, which should be their highest willingness to pay for the
food item. A lottery choice out of 10 chips each indicating one of the 10 prices was then offered to
subjects. The instruction told them that if at their random drawn prices, they said “Yes” on their
bidding sheets, they won the item and would actually pay the randomly drawn price. If instead,
they said “No” at the randomly drawn price on their sheets, then they did not win. In order to help
subjects further understand the procedure and make their bids accountable, some extra notes were
given them explaining why it was to their benefits to bid exactly what the item was worth to them.
Important Notes:
• In this auction, the Best Strategy is to bid EXACTLY what the item is worth to you. Consider
the following: if you bid MORE than the item is worth to you, you may end up having to buy
an item for more than you really want to pay. Conversely, if you bid LESS than the item is
worth to you, you may end up not winning the auction even though you could have bought an
item at a price you were actually willing to pay.
• It is acceptable to choose “No” at all listed prices.
3.2.4 Testing Hypotheses
With the design of the study, the following hypotheses were supposed to be tested:
Hypothesis 1 : (Cognitive Dissonance): Pre-committing to a certain item leads to more favor-
able evaluations, i.e. estimating a lower risk and/or bidding for a higher price (WTP).
As mentioned previously, in the treatment group, subjects were instructed to freely choose 1 out of
3 chocolate candy bars to bid and would have a chance to win only the chosen flavor; whereas in
the control group, subjects did not make any choice, bidding for all 3 items and having a chance to
win a randomly chosen flavor. Comparing the two groups, subjects in the treatment group actually
pre-committed themselves to 1 food item. Putting such restrictions before bidding made subjects
at least being no better off, since they could always choose to bid the same for the item without pre-
committing to it, while still keep the chance of winning other items at desired prices. According to
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cognitive dissonance theory, subjects would in this case rate more favorably for the chosen item and
less favorably for the rejected ones. Equation 1 and 2 were constructed to test these experimental
responses.
Bidij = α0 + α1Treatmenti + α2Preferi + α3Riskij +Xiβ +
3∑
k=2
µk + ij (1)
Riskij = δ0 + δ1Treatmenti + δ2Preferi +Xiβ +
3∑
k=2
µk + ij (2)
In the model, Bidij is the bid made by subject i in informational round j, where j = 1, 2
and 3. Similarly, Riskij is the risk perception reported by subject i in informational round j.
Treatmenti and Preferi are dummy variables, where Treatmenti equals 1 for treatment, and 0
otherwise; Preferi equals 1 if the subject indicated he/she preferred the corresponding food item,
and 0 otherwise. µk represents the informational round fixed effect, round 2 or round 3, as oppose
to the first no information round. Xi is a set of control variables. Note that Equation 1 and 2 apply
to all 3 flavors, with postfixes _pl (Plain), _pe (Peanut) and _al (Almond) respectively.
Testing of H1 focused on the estimated parameters of α1 and δ1 for each flavor. Positive
estimates of α1 and negative estimates of δ1 would support H1. In addition, preference of the food
item was controlled in the model to get an exclusive estimation of the treatment effect. In general,
preference yielded higher bids, indicating consumers being willing to pay a positive premium for
the food they like. Only after controlling for preference could one say the additional jump in bids
between treatment and control group was due to psychological temptations. The effect of preference
on risk perception could be more controversial. In normal cases, the effect should be non-positive.
Zero (or insignificant) for rational agents, since they could objectively perceive the risk regardless
of their preference. For nonrational agents instead, the effect could be negative, indicating a self-
justification/self-compliance tendency to reduce dissonance feelings. (However, for relatively more
exotic and less familiar food, the relationship was undetermined, since consumers might prefer the
food just because they could enjoy the fun of risk. An endogenous problem would bias the result.
Fortunately, this concern was less relevant to this study, since the tested food items were commonly
seen almost every day and everywhere.)
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Hypothesis 2 : (Risk Aversion): When being exposed to relevant risky information about common
item, people in general increase the risk perception and decrease the WTP.
Following from the above discussion about risk perception and preference, H2 was to test that, in
general, consumers perceived risk as a bad attribute and tried to stay away from it when dealing
with common items. In the study, participants were instructed to bid for candy bars (common food
items) in three rounds. Before round 2 and round 3, information regarding potential food-borne
risk involved with food items was revealed to them. According to Equation 1 and 2, H2 would be
supported if the fixed effects µk, k = 1, 2, were negative in Equation 1 and positive in Equation
2. In addition, in Equation 1 the effect of risk perception on bids, that is α3, being negative would
further support the hypothesis.
H2 could also be tested by checking the average changes of bid and risk perception across rounds,
shown in Equation 3 and 4.
dBidjki = γ0 + γ1Treatmenti + γ2Preferi + γ3Risk
j
i + γ4dRisk
jk
i +Xiβ + i (3)
dRiskjki = θ0 + θ1Treatmenti + θ2Preferi + θ3Risk
j
i +Xiβ + i (4)
In Equation 3 and 4, Treatmenti, Preferi and Xi are the same as in Equation 1 and 2. Riskij
is the risk perception of individual i in round j, where j = 1, 2 and 3. dBidjki is the change of bid
for individual i from round k to round j, where j, k = 1, 2 and 3, and k < j. Similarly, dRiskjki is
the change of risk perception for individual i from round k to round j, where j, k = 1, 2 and 3, and
k < j. Same as the previous two equations , Equation 3 and 4 apply to all 3 flavors , with postfixes
_pl (Plain), _pe (Peanut) and _al (Almond) respectively.
Testing of H2 is now equivalent to testing the intercept terms γ0 being significantly negative
and θ0 being significantly positive. Further, the model controls preference and the absolute level of
risk perception. Detailed discussion will be given in the result session.
Hypothesis 3 : (Confirmatory Bias): The tendency to reduce dissonance feelings will (i) mitigate
(or attenuate) the impact of negative information and (ii) amplify (or exaggerate) the
impact of positive information.
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When people experience cognitive dissonance, a natural tendency to reduce dissonance feeling is to
selectively pay attention to (or even make up) information that is in line with previous behaviors
and to intentionally overlook the information that generates the confliction (Frey, 1986). In the
study, food-borne risk information about Aflatoxin was provided to participants before the second
and third rounds of auction. Participants’ reactions in the control group served as a benchmark.
According to H2, risky information would increase risk perceptions of involved food items, i.e.
peanut and almond flavored candy bars, while leaving the risk perception of uninvolved item, i.e.
plain flavored candy bar unchanged.
However, based on choices in the treatment group, the participants reacted differently to support
H3. First, if the subjects who pre-selected peanut or almond flavor were less willing to increase their
risk perceptions, then H3− (i) was supported. In Equation4 one would expect negative θ1 for both
peanut (_pl) and almond (_al) equations between information round (round 2 or 3) and initial
round (round 1). Further, information before the third round auction quantitatively compared
Aflatoxin food-borne risk between peanut and almond. The fact that although the food-borne risk
was typically high in almond products, the concentrations of Aflatoxin detected from them was
only about 1/1000 of that from peanuts was mentioned in the information sheet. While subjects in
the control group would still pick up the information that an almond product was typically high in
Aflatoxin risk and would keep the risk perception roughly unchanged, those who pre-committed to
the almond candy bar in the treatment group would focus more on the fact that almond was less
risky than peanut and hence slightly decrease their risk perceptions from the 2nd round to the 3rd
round. If this was the case, H3 − (ii) would be supported. Checking Equation 4 for the almond
equation with j = 3 and k = 2, estimate of θ1 should be slightly positive.
Hypothesis 4 : (Sticky Behavior): The taste of consistency makes people less likely to change
their behaviors, even though it is to their benefits to do so.
Even though subjects increased their risk perceptions, they would be more reluctant to change their
bids in the treatment group, in which case they pre-committed themselves to one certain item.
This taste of consistency would be supported by positive estimates of γ1 in Equation 3. In real
life, this sticky behavior caused by cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias made consumers less
responsive to food-safety information and keep consuming certain products even when facing high
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risk.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Summary Statistics
Ten sessions of experiments were conducted in mid-late afternoons within two days. A total of 116
subjects participated in the study, 42 of whom were randomly selected to the control group and 74
to the treatment group. Among those in the treatment group, 18 subjects freely chose to bid for
a plain flavor candy bar, 20 chose peanut flavor and the remaining 36 chose almond flavor. Three
general groups of responses were collected for all the participants: 1) risk perceptions and biddings in
the auction games; 2) objective demographics and household background; and 3) subjective beliefs,
including past eating habits, knowledge, awareness and judgment of food-safety issues, etc.
Table 9 listed the demographics and household background for both treatment and control
groups. In general, the two groups were well balanced for the characters such as basic body measures,
social demographics, household composition and dietary habits, etc. The age of participants in both
groups ranged between 18 and 52, with an average of about 41 years old. The mean level of height
and BMI were about 66 inches and 23 respectively. 45.69% were White/Caucasian. The majority of
the subject pool had at least 2-year college education and was currently employed either part-time
or full-time, with an average annual household income of $50K to $75K. On average, the participants
came from families of 3-4 people with 1 kid under 18 years old. Roughly 70% of the participants
claimed themselves as primary grocery shoppers for their families. In terms of eating habit, 7% said
they were currently on diet and 29% had a past experience to be on diet. At the time of study, it
was about 3.27 hours before the participants ate any food.
The main responses in the study were risk perceptions and bids reported by participants during
the auction. Table 10 presented summary statistics with F-test between treatment and control
groups.
The top panel reports results of risk perceptions for 3 flavors in 3 rounds. First of all, control
and treatment groups were not different from each other in estimating risk in the initial round
for the 3 flavors. This was the risk perception when no information regarding food-borne illness
was shown to participants. On average, they estimated 2 out of 10-point-scale for risk with plain
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Table 9: Study 2_Summary Statistics of Demographics
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Table 10: Study 2_Summary Statistics of Risk Perception and WTP by Round
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flavor, 3/10 with almonds, and 4.5/10 with peanuts. The treatment began to play a role in affecting
risk perception when food safety information was provided in the 2nd and 3rd round. Since the
Aflatoxin food-borne risk was highly related to peanut and almond products, but was almost not
relevant to plain flavor candy bar, one would expect risk perception for peanut and almond flavored
candy bars increased and risk perception for plain flavor remained unchanged. While this was the
case, changings in risk perception were not the same between control and treatment groups. For
almond flavor, control groups estimated much higher risk after reading information than treatment
groups (5.14/10 for control vs. 4.17/10 for treatment, F=3.59, P>F=0.06 in round 2; and 5.17/10
for control vs. 3.96/10 for treatment, F=5.17, P>F=0.03 in round 3). For peanut flavor, though
participants in the treatment estimated a slightly higher risk in the first round, their changes in
the 2nd and 3rd rounds were much lower than those of control group. For example, on average, the
increase in risk perception was 1.9/10 in control and only 0.8 in treatment (F=3.06, P>F=0.00)
from round 1 to round 2. These differences between treatment and control group were first signals
supporting cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias. More discussion is provided in later part of
this section.
The bottom panel of Table 10 listed descriptive information about biddings. Based on the
auction mechanism, the bids revealed participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for each food item in
each informational round. One would easily see from Table 3 that participants in treatment bid
higher prices for their pre-selected food items almost in all rounds, i.e. for plain flavor in round 1,
52 cents in control vs. 68 cents in treatment, F=3.83, P>F=0.06; for peanut flavor in round 2, 39
cents in control vs. 79 cents in treatment, P>F=0.00. Further, bids in treatment group roughly
remained the same across all 3 rounds, while in the control group bids for peanut and almond flavor
bars were clearly decreased in the 2nd and 3rd round.
Figure 1 provided a straightforward description of these behavioral responses.
In addition to the above two categories, a third category of responses – beliefs and judgments was
also collected in the post-study survey. More investigation for these responses and their interactions
with the risk perceptions and bidding behaviors is provided later.
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Figure 1: Study 2_Risk Perception and Bid by Information Round & Treatment
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3.3.2 Cognitive Dissonance
Cognitive dissonance hypothesis (H1) was supported if participants in the treatment group made
higher bids in absolute value than those in the control group. The top panel of Table 11 listed the
results of regressing 9 bids (3 flavors in 3 rounds) on the treatment dummy. Initially, participants
in the treatment group bid higher prices for all the 3 flavors. 16 cents higher for plain (t=1.96,
P=0.06), 24 cents higher for peanut (t=3.96, P=0.00) and about 3 cents higher for almond, though
not statistically significant. In the 2nd and 3rd round, risk information was provided to participants.
If the risk information involving peanut and almond can further intensify the dissonance feelings,
one would expect the treatment effect on bid to be enlarged for peanut and almond flavors in these
two rounds. The results were in line with this hypothesis. Peanut flavor candy bars were bid 35
cents and 37 cents higher in the 2nd round and the 3rd respectively. Almond flavor was bid 13 cents
and 14 cents higher and the significant level was 5%. For plain flavor, since it was not involved
in the risk information, the difference in bid between control and treatment disappeared in the
last two rounds, which also supported the dissonance hypothesis on the flip side. That was, initial
dissonance due to free choice (/pre-commitment) could be reduced by any (ambiguous) information
that seemed to support the earlier choice behavior.
To further verify treatment effects, regressions for each flavor were run using only those who
claimed they loved the corresponding flavor. For each flavor, this subset of the sample pool included
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Table 11: Study 2_Average Treatment Effects on Bid - All & Preferred Only
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all participants in the treatment, and the part of participants in the control who reported in the
survey that they prefer the certain flavor to the other two alternatives. Based on self-reported
preferences, final subsets had 33 observations for plain flavor, 29 for peanut and 52 for almond.
This partition of data could help to exclude the effect of preference on bidding premiums between
two groups, and get a much cleaner estimation of the dissonance effect.
The bottom panel of Table 11 presented the results using these sub-samples. The bidding
premium was decreased to only 6 cents for plain flavor in the initial round, and 2 to 3cents for
almond flavor in the two informational rounds. This implied preference did perform a role in
making participants bid higher. However, after excluding preference effects, bidding premiums for
peanut candy bars remained to be 30-40 cents with 1% significant level. Existence of cognitive
dissonance was established even after controlling for preference effects.
Table 12 listed the estimated average treatment effects (ATE) on bidding premiums with different
combinations of the control variables. As shown in the table, treatment effects were stable while
controlling for risk perceptions and preferences. Further, effects of preference on bidding for all
9 scenarios within control group were listed on the bottom. Subtracting these numbers from the
treatment effects using all observations (top panel of Table 12) could also yield exclusive estimations
of dissonance effects on bidding behaviors (so long as treatment was assigned randomly, which was
guaranteed by the design of the study).
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Table 12: Study 2_ATE on Bid - Robustness Check
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3.3.3 Manipulation Check
Manipulation in the study was the information regarding Aflatoxin food-borne risk provided to
participants before the 2nd and the 3rd round of auction. Peanut products were highly involved
with this risk, followed by almond products. Those plain flavored chocolate candy bars were believed
to be unrelated. Validity of this manipulation could be verified by checking reported risk perceptions
across 3 rounds for all 3 flavors.
On average, participants reported 2.08 out of 10 points of risk associated with plain flavored
candy bars, 5.3 out of 10 with peanut flavor and 4.67 out of 10 for almond flavor. Testing the
equality between any pair of means was rejected, suggesting almond flavor was perceived higher in
risk than plain flavor (t=3.58, P=0.00) and risk perception of peanut flavor was the highest among
the three (peanut vs. almond, t=4.86, P=0.00). The manipulation of different risk perceptions
across product was established successfully.
Further, Table 13 showed the average levels of participants’ self-reported risk perceptions in 9
cases. As shown in the constant row, risk perceptions for peanut increased from 4.4 in the 1st round
to 5.8 in the 2nd and 6.5 in the 3rd; risk perception for almond also increased from 3.3 in the initial
round to about 5.2 in the later rounds, while for plain flavor, risk perception remained constantly
at around 2. The changes in risk perceptions across rounds were also tested using Equation 4. The
average change of risk perception corresponded to the intercept term θ0 in Equation 4. As shown
49
Table 13: Study 2_Independence of Risk Perception on Treatment & Preference
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Table 14: Study 2_ATE on Changes in Risk Perception - All & Preferred Only
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Table&3.2:+ATE+for+Changes+in+Risk+Assessments,+All+&+Prefer+Only+
in Table 14, for example, the average change in risk perception for peanut candy bar was 1.88 (t=
9.37, P=0.00) in round 2 as opposed to round 1 and the change for almond candy was 2.07 (t=8.41,
P=0.00) in round 3 compared to round 1. Hence, the manipulation of different risk perceptions
across informational rounds was also proved to be effective. H2 is supported.
In addition, risk perceptions were shown to be unrelated with preferences (Table 13). This
implied that participants were to some extent rational enough to objectively estimate risk and were
not impacted by their own preferences. This finding validated Equation 1 through 4, which used
risk perception and preference as two independent control variables to estimate treatment effects.
During the study, wherever a list of the 3 food items was mentioned to participants, the order of
the 3 was randomized so as to make sure there was no confounded order effect. Further, regressions
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were run to double check. For the control group, participants’ bids were not significantly related to
the order of the food being mentioned. For the treatment group, order of the food items did not
predict participants’ choices, either.
3.3.4 Confirmation Bias
Though participants did respond to the information provided to them, the magnitude of reaction was
not the same between treatment and control groups. These findings brought us to the investigation
of H3, confirmatory bias. Confirmatory bias was defined as a natural tendency to selectively pay
attention to relevant information so as to reduce the dissonance feelings. To be more detailed, when
participants tried to overlook the available information that was conflicting to their previous choices
and/or became less sensitive to it, they were experiencing confirmatory bias. On the flip side, being
sensitive to some irrelevant information or interpreting information as supporting evidence to the
previous behaviors were also signals of confirmatory bias.
Changes in risk perceptions across rounds in Table 14 supported the above hypothesis (H3).
Columns 4-6 reported regression results of changes in risk perception for peanut flavor between the
2nd and the 1st round (i.e. dRisk_pe21), the 3rd and the 1st round and the 2nd and the 3rd round
respectively. Similarly, columns 7-9 were the results for almond flavor.
Take the peanut flavor candy bar as an example, the control group people on average increased
their risk perception by 1.881 points after reading the first piece of information in the 2nd round
auction (Column 4 in Table 8). However, those in the treatment only increased their perception by
0.8 points (=1.881-1.081), implying that they were more reluctant to respond to the risk information
regarding the food item they just pre-committed to. Same thing happened to the almond flavor,
too. The control group increased risk perception by 2.048 (Column 7), whereas the increase in the
treatment group was only about 1.2 (=2.048-0.848).
Proportion of perception updating that happened in the first stage (i.e. from the 1st round to
the 2nd round) also demonstrated difference in sensitivity to information between two groups. Take
peanut flavor as an example, in the control group, risk perception increased 2.452 in total from
the beginning to the end (i.e. difference between 1st and 3rd round), and increased 1.881 (points)
immediately in the 2nd round, which was the first chance when the participants could update their
perceptions. In this sense, participants made 76.71% (=1.881/2.452) of updating in the first stage.
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In contrast, in the treatment group, the total increase in risk perception was about 1.9 (=2.452-
0.552), and about 0.8 (=1.881-1.081) in the 2nd round. The immediate updating proportion was
only 42.11% (=0.8/1.9). This result implied that participants in the treatment group were more
reluctant to respond to information about negative attributes of the food they chose earlier.
For almond flavor candy bars, participants in the treatment group increased their risk perceptions
by only 0.985 (=2.071-1.086) in total, compared with 2.071 in the control group. But interestingly,
as early as in the 2nd round, the increase was 1.2 (=2.048-0.848) in the treatment group. This
implied that in the 3rd round, participants even lowered risk perceptions by roughly 0.215 (=1.2-
0.985) points in the treatment group. According to the information being provided in the 3rd round,
while people in the control group still picked up the main idea that almond products were high in
Aflatoxin food-borne risk, those in the treatment obviously were more attracted by the signal that
almond products had a much lower detected concentration of Aflatoxin than peanut products and
thus, interpreted it as a favorable evidence to modify their beliefs. The above findings supported
H3, that people selectively pay attention to information so as to reduce dissonance feelings. The
bottom part of Table 14 controlled for preference by using the subset of the participants who claimed
they preferred the food for regressions, just as in Table 11 (Section 8.2). Results showed that after
restricting observations to only those who had strong preference to the food in both groups, the
major findings about confirmatory bias still remained.
3.3.5 Sticky Behavior
While participants updated their beliefs differently after reading pieces of information, it is interest-
ing to see if their purchase tendency was impacted in the same way. ByH4, consumers would have
a taste of consistency and hence, be less willing to change their purchase behaviors. In the study,
the participants in the treatment made their choices explicitly in the first place, but people in the
control group did not. If we can find the participants in the treatment group were less willing to
change their bids after reading risk information, then H4 was supported.
Table 15 showed the results of treatment effects on changes in bid. Similar as in Table 14, the
top panel used all observations and the bottom panel used only those who claimed they preferred
the food to control the effect of preference. As shown in the table, for peanut flavor, participants
in the control group decreased their bids by 16 cents in the 2nd round and 7 cents in the 3rd
52
Table 15: Study 2_ATE on Changes in Bid - All & Preferred Only
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Table&4.2:+ATE+for+Changes+in+Bids,+All+&+Prefer+Only+
round. However, subjects in the treatment group decreased their bids by only 4 cents in the 2nd
round and 5 cents in the 3rd round. The differences between treatment and control were significant
at 1% level. In terms of proportion, the control group made 69.57% (=16 / (16+7)) of the total
changing immediately after reading the first piece of information, whereas the treatment group made
only 44.44% (=4 / (4+5)) of the changing in the first available chance. Taking absolute values of
initial bids into account, the same information regarding food-borne illness of the same food item
yielded about 42.36% (=0.23/0.543) decrease in willingness to pay (WTP) for those who did not
pre-committed to the food, but only about 11.54% decrease in WTP for those who made their
pre-commitment. While one could say loyal customers were less likely to be affected by negative
news of their beloved products, they were also less sensible and less responsive in picking up crucial
information when health or even safety issues were involved. Same patterns were also found for
almond flavor in the table.
In addition, it was sensible to check the proportion or number of participants who changed their
preferences after the study and try to link this to the changing in risk perceptions and bidding
behaviors could be interesting.
Table 16 above listed absolute numbers and percentages of participants’ claimed preferences. In
the control group, roughly 9.52% (=26.19%-16.67%) of participants’ switched away from peanut
products after the study, and 7.15% (=40.48%-33.33%) for almond products. In comparison,
the switching percentages in the treatment group were only 5.41% (=28.37%-22.97%) and 4.95%
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Table 16: Study 2_Preference Changes Before & After Study by Flavor
Prefer Plain Prefer Peanut Prefer Almond Total
Control Before # 14 11 17 42
           % 33.33 26.19 40.48 100
After # 21 7 14 42
         % 50 16.67 33.33 100
Treatment Before # 21 21 32 74
           % 28.38 28.38 43.24 100
After # 28 17 29 74
         % 37.84 22.97 39.19 100
(=43.24%-39.19%) respectively. Evidence suggested that after pre-committing to some certain food
(in the treatment group), dissonance feelings made subjects less willing to change their behaviors
and/or more inclined to stick to their previous behaviors.
3.3.6 Habits, Risk Perceptions and Causal Effects (Identification and Validation)
After talking about how participants in the treatment group behaved differently from those in the
control group in making and changing their bids (WTP: willingness to pay), this section starts to
talk about what were the main reasons that caused these differences. In the study, there were two
major reasons. One was long-term preference and the other was risk perception manipulated by
the experimental design. The following two sub-sections discussed how these two factors interacted
with psychological biases and finally impacted behaviors.
Determinants of Absolute WTP Table 17 listed partitioned regressions of bid for all 9 scenarios
(3 flavors in 3 rounds). Risk perceptions and preference were controlled in these regressions.
First of all, preference did have significant impact on participants’ bids. For plain and almond
flavor, preference yielded about 15 cents more in WTP. This preference premium reduced the treat-
ment effects to about 5 cents for plain flavor in the initial round and 6 cents for almond flavor in
the two informational rounds. Previously, as shown in Table 11, these treatment effects were 16
cents for the former and 13 cents for the latter. However, one could not merely say these preference
interpretations disprove the dissonance argument that had been made earlier. Observing prefer-
ence premiums across (information) rounds within each flavor, one could find for plain flavor, the
premium increased from the first round to the second round and for almond flavor, the premium
decreased. One interpretation of these findings was that the manipulation of risk perception trig-
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Table 17: Study 2_ATE on Bid - Causal Inference
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Table&2:)ATE)on)Bids)&)Causal)Inference)
gered the interaction between preference and dissonance feeling. For plain flavor, since the risk
information was not relevant to it, the premium was reinforced and people who claimed that they
preferred the flavor were willing to pay 3 (=$0.186-$0.155) cents more. In contrast, since almond
flavor was involved in the food safety information, the preference premium decreased (from 18 cents
to 15 cents, then to 13 cents) as participants read the information.
Interestingly, the effect of preference on WTP was negative for the peanut flavor candy bars.
This strange relationship can be caused by the trade-off with the treatment effect. The treatment
effect (adding premiums to bids due to pre-commitment) was so strong that the preference effect
compromised to be negative when fitting the data. Another explanation could be a cross-product
effect with plain and almond flavor. As peanut flavor being a more common option in the daily life
than the other two alternatives, those who liked it bid for a lower price.
Compared to the significant impact of preference, risk perception seemed to be less influential
in affecting WTPs. It almost had no impact on the WTP for plain flavor. For almond, although
it was pretty close to be significant in the third round, the magnitude of effect was only as low as
2 cents. Risk perception played a significant role only for peanut flavor in the two informational
rounds, yielding 3-cent and 5-cent decrease in WTP for every one-point increase in risk percep-
tion. Considering the fact that peanut products were highly involved in the provided food safety
information, these significant estimates could be seen as signal for successful manipulation.
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Table 18: Study 2_ATE on Changes in Bid - Causal Inference, All
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Table&4.1ATE,for,Changes,in,Bids,&,Causal,Inference,,All,,
Determinants of Changes in WTP Table 18 showed how changes in WTP were explained by
driving factors, i.e. treatment, preference, risk perception and its changes, etc. While preference
was more important in explaining pure WTP, risk perceptions had more explanatory power in
interpreting the changes in WTP. Note first that dependent variables in Table 18 were changes in
WTP from an earlier round to a later round (i.e. dBid_pe21 = Bid_pe2 − Bid_pe1), and hence,
were all negative in value. In the table, for peanut and almond flavor, the absolute values of risk
perceptions negatively significantly impacted changes in WTP between the last two rounds and the
initial round (Column 4, 5 and 7, 8); and changes in risk perception negatively significantly impacted
changes in WTP within the last two rounds (Column 6 and 9). On average, 1 point increase in
absolute value of risk perception in a certain round (round 2 or 3) yielded about 2 cents’ decrease in
WTP compared to the first round. 1 point increase in the changes of risk perception yielded about
4.6 cents’ decrease in WTP for peanut between second and third round and 2.2 cents’ decrease for
almond. Preference, however, was only significant to changes between the last two rounds for plain
and peanut flavors.
In addition to the impact of preference and risk perceptions, treatment still played its role in
mitigating changes in WTPs, significant and large (in magnitude) for peanut flavor, and close to
significant and relatively smaller (in magnitude) for almond flavor. These positive estimates of the
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Table 19: Study 2_ATE on Changes in Bid - Causal Inference, Preferred Only
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Table&4.2:+ATE+for+Changes+in+Bids+&+Causal+Inference,+Prefer+Only++
treatment effect were evidence of sticky behaviors due to consumers’ taste of consistency.
Table 19 showed the robustness check for the above findings by using only those who preferred
the certain flavor. Comparing Table 19 with Table 18, one can find that the main results are
consistent.
3.3.7 Market Demand and Price Elasticity
Individual responses to food safety information under different treatment situations were discussed
in the above sections. In this section, the focus is the aggregated results derived from each group.
This section provides insights about market responses to food safety information for different groups
of customers.
In order to investigate market responses, aggregate demands for each flavor were derived from
the following subgroups: 1) control group, 2) treatment group, 3) control group with only subjects
who preferred the flavor, 4) control group with only subjects who did not prefer the flavor and 5)
all subjects in both control and treatment groups. The aggregate demands were then converted to
demand shares for each subgroup so as to make all 5 sub-groups comparable.
Table 20 listed the regression results of the fitted inverse demand functions for each flavor-
subgroup combination. Equation 5 is the inverse demand functional form used in fitting regressions
in Table 20.
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Table 20: Study 2_Inverse Demand Curve by Group
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Table&5:)Demand)Curves)with)Infoma:on)Fixed)Eﬀects)
Price(flavor, group) = a+ bDemand(flavor, group) +
3∑
k=2
µk + (flavor, group) (5)
In Equation 5, the inverse demand function was specific to “flavor, group” combination. There
were 3 flavors and 5 subgroups of subjects, each representing a customer pool in the real market.
Price was exogenously given by the design of the study. 11 price values ranged from $0 to $1, with
increment of 10 cents. Demand was calculated as the inverse cumulative percentage in accordance
to each price value (i.e. the demand D at a certain price P is the percentage of the biddings that are
higher than or equal to P ). The constant a represented the intercept of the inverse demand for the
first round (default, no information). b was the slope effect. By the construction of the model, price
elasticity can be calculated by e = dDemand/DemanddPrice/Price . µk represented the shift of the inverse demand
curve caused by the information in either round 2 or round 3. Focus was given to the comparison
of these estimates across subgroups so as to capture different market responses to risk information.
According to the results in Table 20, the slopes of the demand curves were roughly 0.1 for all
cases. In response to risk information, demand for peanut and almond flavor both shifted downward,
while demand for plain flavor did not, which once again suggested the successful manipulation of
risk information. However, for both peanut and almond flavor, the shift of demand curve was not
the same across different subgroups. Take peanut flavor for example, the demand curve shifted
13 cents downwards in the control group (Column 4), which meant at any given demand level (in
terms of market demand share), the price was 13 cents less in round 2 than in round 1. In contrast,
the treatment group did not show any significant downward shift after the same risk information
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Figure 2: Study 2_Demand Curves in Percentage Share - Peanut
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being revealed to participants (Column 5). Similarly, in the third round, the downward shift was
20 cents for control group, significant at 1% level; and only 7 cents for the treatment group, but
statistically insignificant. Differences remained when comparison was made between treatment and
control with only those who preferred peanut flavor (Column 6). Same for almond flavor, even
though the demand curve significantly shifted down for both treatment (Column 10) and control
group (Column 9), the magnitude of shift was always larger in control group than in treatment (15
cents vs. 7 in round 2 and 18 cents vs. 9 in round 3).
Figure 2 to 4 showed the shift of demand curves across rounds for each flavor and subgroup.
Differences in the shift of demand curve suggested that customers with long-last preference or pre-
commitment were less responsive to food safety information regarding the product they previously
chosen. Psychological biases were crucial in influencing the efficacy of public health communication
with consumers.
3.4 Discussion
This study investigated how individual consumers react to food safety information and make pur-
chase decision. Using an incentive compatible auction mechanism, this study elicited consumers’
WTP under different informational settings. Consistent to the findings in psychology, consumer’s
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Figure 3: Study 2_Demand Curves in Percentage Share - Almond
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Figure 4: Study 2_Demand Curves in Percentage Share - Plain
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judgment and information processing depend a lot on their initial beliefs or consumption status.
Results showed that consumers bid much higher when they freely chose food items (treatment)
than when they were randomly assigned (control), suggesting cognitive dissonance. On average,
the bidding premium was about 13 cents (roughly 30%) higher for low-risk food item and 30 cents
(almost 60%) higher for high-risk item. The bidding premiums were further enlarged as food safety
information was revealed to consumers. Confirmation bias hypothesis was supported by the finding
that free-choice group was more reluctant to change the bids despite of increased risk perceptions.
In terms of market responses, due to psychological biases among consumers, demand curves were
less possible to shift down under food safety risk.
Results in this study suggested that consumers were less responsive to public information due
to their existing habits. Extra strategies would be needed to increase the efficiency of public com-
munication to promote health.
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4 Chapter 4
Study 3: Credit Rationing under Lenders’ Risk-Aversion and
Asymmetric Adverse Incentives
4.1 Introduction
Incentive mechanisms are important attributes to financial decision-making. The incentives influ-
ence lenders’ loan decisions, which in turn affect the profitability of financial institutes and the
availability of credit supply in the market. These impacts have far-reaching implications. For ex-
ample, accessibility to micro credit is crucial for economic development in rural and poor areas.
But if correct incentives are not in place, lenders may ignore the social significance of their deci-
sions, and avoid lending to potentially high risk micro credit clients. The tranditional approach to
understanding the lender-borrower relationship has been brought to economics of credit rationing1
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). However, some recent research began to link credit rationing to incentive
mechanisms (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008). Under this reasoning, the standard credit rationing model
may not be a complete explanation; rather in an environment with incentives a form of policy in-
stitutional rationing is exposed, in which it is the rules of the game that lead to rationing, and not
borrowers’ risk per se. This study complements the literature along this stream by showing that
certain incentive schemes can result in credit rationing through lenders’ risk-aversion and behavioral
responses. It empirically extends the incentive mechanism design in banking to a behavioral scope.
Furthermore, the results contribute to the increase of profitability in financial institutes, help to
alleviate credit rationing and stabilize credit supply in the market.
The study is set in the micro credit loan market for farm households in China. Rural Credit
Cooperatives (RCCs) provide the majority of financial services to farmers in rural China. In order to
control credit risk and maintain profitability, the CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission)
has provided guidelines to RCCs to adopt a performance-based internal incentive structure for
their loan officers, called the Personal Responsibility System (PRS). The PRS provides bonuses to
loan officers for approved loans that are in performance (or performing loans, PLs) while imposing
penalties on non-performing loans (NPLs). While this incentive structure successfully keeps the
1By Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing happens if some applicants receive loans, while others with similar
credit risk do not even when they are willing to offer higher interest rates.
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NPL ratio low, it may have the adverse incentive of encouraging lenders to reject loans that would
have otherwise been good. This adverse incentive not only threatens the profitability of RCCs, but
also results in unnecessary credit rationing of farmers2. So far, this incentive mechanism in China
has never been questioned, let alone tested. This study investigates how incentive structures like
the PRS affect the lending practice of loan officers.
How agents respond to incentives is difficult to quantify. In this study, experimental techniques
were developed to investigate the incentives faced by front-line rural lenders under China’s Personal
Responsibility System (PRS). In the experiment, loan officers from local RCCs in Shandong, China
were recruited to evaluate randomly selected loan applications and make lending decisions. All loan
files were previously approved with known performance and repayment status. Each loan officer
was randomly assigned to one of two incentive groups. One was analogous to pure PRS, and the
other was the PRS with an additional dis-incentive for Type II error (i.e. lose monetary payoff when
rejecting good loans). For both groups, the expected monetary payoff was roughly one day salary.
The two groups were further randomized over prior knowledge about the probability distribution
of the application pool. Half of them were informed that loan files were randomly selected from a
database with 50:50 PLs and NPLs, while the other half were not informed.
This experimental approach has the following important features that can help uncover the
relationship between incentive mechanisms and lending behavior. First, a control group with in-
centive structure proportionally mimicking the PRS generates a benchmark to better understand
the lending behaviors. Second, exogenously varying incentive structure by adding an additional
dis-incentive (penalty) for Type II error induces clear estimation of the relative strengths and/or
weaknesses of managerial incentives. Third, randomly introducing probability knowledge about
the application pool reveals the interdependent effects of prior perception and incentive schemes on
decision-making. Fourth, using previously approved loan files makes decision outcomes fully observ-
able and comparable. Hence, incentive efficacy, profitability and credit rationing can be examined
under alternative institutional settings.
2High frequency of loan misclassification affects the stability and profitability of financial institutes. For Type
I error (i.e. approve a bad loan), financial institutes lose the principal, and for Type II error (i.e. reject a good
loan), financial institutes forgone the revenues associated with good loans. As Nayak and Turvey (1997) argued, with
excess demand of funds, a lender will not keep money idle. So the cost of Type II error can be considered as the
difference between the revenue forgone from a good borrower and the expected profit from an alternative loan. When
the alternative loan is of high risk, Type II error could be rather costly. As a key financial institute for microcredit
loans, profitability of RCCs immediately influences the stability and sustainability of financial supply to farmers.
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The efficacy of incentive structures can be estimated by the mean differences between treatment
conditions. In the Baseline Condition (BC), the incentive structure was set proportional to pure
PRS without revealing probabilities about the application pool. In the Dis-incentive Condition
(DC), loan officers were given an additional dis-incentive (penalty) for Type II error (i.e. rejecting
loans that are in performance) when they were making lending decisions. Probability information
was not offered in this condition, either. In the Probability Condition (PC), the loan officers kept
using pure PRS, but were offered probability distribution information about loan applications. In
the Mixed Condition (MC), both dis-incentive for Type II error and prior probability knowledge
were imposed on the loan officers. This counterfactual model will reveal the degree of risk avoidance
brought about by adverse incentives by examining differences in patterns of loan acceptance and
rejection with Type I (i.e. approving non-performing loans) and Type II error. Combining decisions
with specific loan file features, aggregate loan supply changes in the market, and profitability changes
in the RCCs can then be assessed. In addition, the interdependence between prior probabilities and
incentives can be analyzed through the experimental conditions in place.
Results showed that in the Baseline Condition, loan officers on average approved 44% of the
applications. Due to a sense of risk and/or loss aversion, they were 12.9% less likely to approve
a loan under pure PRS than when there was additional dis-incentive for Type II error, suggesting
credit rationing. As a result, the frequency of Type II error was 10.2% higher under PRS, which
implied up to 41.52% decrease of interest returns in RCCs and 37.7% decrease of credit supply
in the financial market. Moreover, ambiguity about riskiness of the application pool made credit
rationing even more severe. Providing probability information removed ambiguity and offset the
negative prior. Approval rates increased about 12% with probability information. This yielded a
significant decline of Type II error at the cost of an insignificant jump in Type I error. This is a
significant result for not only does it reveal that adverse incentives can affect loan decisions, but also
ambiguity about loan riskiness acts along with the incentive mechanisms to affect loan outcomes.
Evidence from the study generates the following implications. First, the PRS forces a loan officer
to face the risk of penalty in case of NPLs, but at the same time implicitly offers them a “secure”
option of rejecting any loans to avoid the risk. As a result, a risk-averse loan officer chooses the
“secure” option to “insure” the risk of loss. This conservative behavior generates credit rationing
in the loan market, increases Type II error and lowers interest returns of RCCs. Second, when
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balanced (Type I and Type II) incentives are in place, loan officers are relatively less averse to Type
I error, because they must now contend with Type II error and balance. Finally, providing prior
information about the application pool offsets ambiguity and leads to decision accuracy.
Due to the challenge of observing internal dynamics of a bank’s managerial processes, and
measuring their impacts on decision-making and lending, empirical evidence about institutional
efficacy in banking remains scarce. Results of this research complement the literature in the following
fields: theories of credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Jaffee and Russell, 1976; and Leland
and Pyle, 1977); credit rationing in developing countries (Ghosh et al., 2000; Karlan and Morduch,
2009; Banerjee, Cole and Duflo, 2008); empirical literature on agency problems in banks (Liberti
2003, Liberti and Mian 2009, Agarwal and Wang 2009, Hertzberg et al. 2010); incentives within firm
(Lazear, 2000; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2007, 2009; Paarsch and Shearer, 2009; Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2010); bank function and organizational design (Berger et al., 2001; Berger and
Udell, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Mian, 2006); and field experiments about
risk-taking and credit decisions in a micro finance context (Gine, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch,
2010; Fischer, 2010; Kanz, 2010).
Theoretically, the study extends the principal-agent problem and incentive mechanism design in
banking to a behavioral scope. In practice, this study contributes to the increase of stability and
profitability of financial institutes in general and RCCs in particular. For banking policy, this study
adds value to credit rationing alleviation and loan supply stabilization in the financial market. More
profoundly, this study imposes positive effects on sustainable accessibility to financial services in less
developing areas and helps to promote social development and poverty alleviation in the long-run.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature. Section
4.3 describes the background of micro credit market and institutional arrangements in China upon
which the experiment was set. Section 4.4 provides a behavioral model of loan decision-making
to guide the design of experiment. Section 4.5 outlines the experimental design and method of
randomization. Section 4.6 presents the empirical results. Section 4.7 discusses robustness and
validity. Section 4.8 discusses and concludes the paper.
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4.2 Literature Review
Ghosh et al. in their review of credit rationing draw reader’s attention to two different forms of
quantity constraints: micro credit rationing, which places credit limits on borrowers (below first-
best levels), and macro credit rationing, which randomly denies access to any credit to a fraction
of borrowers. The second form involves asymmetric treatment of otherwise identical agents. They
showed that both forms of rationing might coexist, and play complementary but distinct roles. The
second form of rationing gains in importance when information flow within the lending community
is poor.
In our study, in the Chinese context, the PRS is dictated as central policy by the CBRC and is
aligned with Ghosh et al.’s macro view. In this context, we identify these observations about macro
effects with what we have referred to as “policy rationing”. The separation of these policy impacts
from Stiglitz and Weiss’s credit rationing at the lender-borrower level is in fact a useful departure,
which permits one to review a number of related studies in a broader context.
Following the stream of theoretical approaches, many studies devoted in efficient mechanism
design and improving institutional settings. There are two major directions. One is on borrowers’
side and the other is on lenders side.
Literature on borrower incentives has many interesting studies. For example, Fischer (2008)
developed a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal insurance, and formal finan-
cial contracts. He then tested model predictions using a series of experiments with clients of a
large microfinance institution in India. The experiments confirmed that joint liability creates two
incentive efficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments with-
out compensating partners for this risk. Second, the addition of peer-monitoring overcompensates,
leading to sharp reductions in risk-taking and profitability.
Gine, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch (2010) systematically unpacked microfinance mechanisms
through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru.
They found dynamic incentives strongly reduce risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms.
Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when
borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance
against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse.
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Cassar and Wydick (2008) addressed the effect of social capital on group lending by conducting
an artifactual experiment in five countries. They carried out treatments for social homogeneity,
group monitoring, and self-selection. Results showed contribution rates differ substantially between
countries, and the influence of different types of social capital varies depending on context, that
group lending appears to create as well as harness social capital, and that peer monitoring can
have perverse as well as beneficial effects on group performance. They also distinguished between
spiritual capital and social capital among religions, finding mild evidence for the effect of spiritual
capital on borrowing group performance.
Our study focuses primarily on lender incentives. Most relevant research includs but is not
limited to, for example, Banerjee, Cole and Duflo (2009) who used observational data in India
to empirically test a model of lending in which loan officers face both an incentive to lend, and
the possibility of penalties for making loans that go bad. They found evidence that following the
discovery of a fraud in a particular bank branch, vigilance activities greatly increases. This in turn
results in reduced lending: the amount of credit declines sharply at the affected bank branch, as
well as neighboring branches. This effect is large, and persists in part for up to two years. Bank
risk-taking also declines following an inspection.
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2009) found empirical evidence that regulation and super-
vision negatively impact profitability of financial institution, and are associated with substantially
large average loan sizes and less lending to women. The pattern is consistent with the notion that
profit-oriented microfinance institutions absorb the cost of supervision by curtailing outreach to
market segments that tend to be more costly per dollar lent. By contrast, microfinance institu-
tions that rely on non-commercial sources of funding (for example, donations), and thus are less
profit-oriented, do not adjust loan sizes or lend less to women when supervised.
Kanz (2010) analyzed the effect of organizational structure on bank lending by using a framed
field experiment in Indian market for small enterprise loans. Results showed that supervision reduces
defaults and increases loan-level profit, but at the same time discourages collection and use of
qualitative information. Incentive contracts such as performance pay can moderate the adverse
effects. Findings shed new light on the nature and importance of agency conflict within the bank,
and suggest that performance pay can play an important role in mitigating information and agency
problems in the provision of entrepreneurial finance in an emerging market.
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Our study also falls into broader empirical literature on agency problems in banks, incen-
tives within firm, and bank function and organizational design. Typical studies are, for example:
Hertzberg et al. (2010) who presented evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate
moral hazard in communication. Based on a commercial banks internal reporting data they showed
that agents do not report bad news if it reflects poorly on their own ability. A rotation policy
that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers changes this reporting behavior. When an officer
anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrowers
repayment prospects. Further, improved communication has first order effects on lending outcomes.
Agarwal and Wang (2009) used a unique data set on small business loan officer compensation
from a major commercial bank to test model predictions that incentive compensation increases loan
origination, but may induce loan officers to book more risky loans. They found that the incentive
package amounts to a 47% increase in loan approval rate, and a 24% increase in default rate. Overall,
the bank loses money by switching to incentive pay.
For incentives within firms, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010) presented evidence from a
field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the produc-
tivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments,
makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends.
Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a
tournament increases it by 24%. Results implied that provision of team-based incentives crowds
out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under team production.
For bank function and organizational design, Mian (2006) showed that greater cultural and geo-
graphical distance between a foreign bank’s headquarters and local branches leads it to further avoid
lending to “informationally difficult” yet fundamentally sound firms requiring relational contract-
ing. Greater distance also makes them less likely to bilaterally renegotiate, and less successful at
recovering defaults. These distance constraints can be large enough to permanently exclude certain
sectors of the economy from financing by foreign banks.
4.3 Incentive Mechanisms and the Personal Responsibility System
Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) have been identified as a key vehicle for the delivery of finan-
cial services to small-scale entrepreneur and customers in rural areas in China. RCCs were first
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established during the rural corporative movement in 1950s. They account for 11.5% of deposits
(CNY3 2,233 billion), 10% of loans outstanding (CNY 1,618 billion) of the banking sector, and 85%
of agriculture loans. China has 32,397 RCCs with about 628,000 employees, 2,441 RCC unions
(RCCUs) at the county level, 65 RCCUs at the prefecture level, and 6 RCCUs at provincial level4.
Agriculture loans outstanding by RCCs in June 2003 amounted to CNY 700 billion. Farmer loans
amounted to CNY 555 billion and microcredit loans amounted to CNY 114 billion.
Though RCCs play an important role in providing financial services in rural areas, they still
have many institutional problems, among which historically high frequency of non-performing loans
(NPLs) was a biggest one. Nowadays, in order to avoid approving loans that are of high credit risk
(loans which have high potential to become NPLs), while at the same time still keep promoting
loan amount to maintain profit level, RCCs adopt an incentive mechanism called the Personal
Responsibility System (PRS). Briefly speaking, the PRS is an internal institution of credit risk
management in RCCs. The PRS on the one hand, provides bonuses to loan officers for approved
loans that are in performance; and on the other hand, imposes penalties to those who are responsible
for NPLs in case of loss.
To be more detailed, PRS first specifies responsibility of loan application shared by relevant
personnel. In a typical microcredit loan application procedure, the primary loan officer meets the
loan applicant, investigates the household and/or business situation on-site, writes credit reports
and finally put together the application package. A secondary loan officer reviews application ma-
terials and makes a joint decision of approving or rejecting with the primary officer. Two managers
supervise the whole procedure and provide guidance when necessary. Upon approval, the primary
loan officer takes responsibility of 60% of the loan amount. The secondary loan officer takes another
30% and two managers take 5% each.
During the loans outstanding period, in addition to the base salary, loan officers also obtain
performance salary based upon the performance of loans they are responsible for. The monthly
performance salary comes from two parts: first, a loan officer gets CNY 0.5/10,000 of performing
loan amount; second, he gets another CNY 300/10,000 from the interests generated from performing
loans. If there is no interest or a repayment delay, 90% of the total monthly performance salary is
3Chinese Yuan
4Statistics as of 2005.
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given to loan officers as bonus and 10% is withheld as risk deposit. The 10% deposit will then be
returned to loan officers in the first month of next year. In case of interest or a repayment delay, a
loan officer gets only CNY 0.2/10,000 of loan amount from NPLs and CNY 150/10,000 of delayed
interests collected later. Moreover, the risk deposit under his account will be deducted to (partially)
recover the losses. A loan officer is also responsible for the collection of delayed repayments. If he
cannot finish his monthly assignment in full, but can finish more than 50%, he gets a proportion of
his monthly performance salary. The proportion equals to the percentage of the monthly assignment
fulfilled. If, instead he finishes less than 50% of the assignment, he loses all the monthly performance
salary. In the RCCs in Shandong Province which collaborated in our experiments, a loan officer on
average gets CNY 2,000-3,000 per month for base salary and CNY 4,000 to 5,000 for performance
salary. In case of delayed payments and/or NPLs, a loan officer can lose up to all of his performance
salary, which is roughly two times of the base salary, or 70% of his total monthly income.
The Personal Responsibility System (PRS) did a good job in keeping the NPL ratio low. Within
the past 10 years, together with many other reforms, the PRS has decreased the NPL ratio in RCCs
sharply from 44% to 5%5. However, performance metrics such as these may in fact be overestimating
performance because they exclude unobserved losses from good loans that were ultimately rejected.
The proposition guiding this research is that under the PRS, when there is a chance of being
penalized, a risk-averse loan officer can be more inclined to reject a loan than a risk-neutral one
so as to avoid the risk of penalty. When the penalty can make a loan officer lose what he already
owned, a sense of loss aversion can further reinforce the tendency to reject any loans. While the
institutional setting of the PRS keeps the frequency of Type I error being low, a potential side-effect
caused by loan officers’ decision behaviors is a high frequency of Type II error.
4.4 Theoretical Model
In order to better understand loan decision behaviors associated with credit risk and make a clear
guidance for the experimental design, a behavioral model is proposed in this section to describe
the decision procedure. It is assumed that for any lending decision a loan officer makes, he expects
to experience a standard “monetary utility” 6 and a “gain-loss utility”. In deterministic environ-
5“Rural Credit Cooperatives in China” in Planet Finance, p1-4.
6It is the so-called “intrinsic utility” under the classic utility theory framework. Sometimes, it is also called
“consumption utility”. Since a loan officer never “consumes” a loan, but rather makes decision of either approving or
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ments, a loan officer choices to maximize monetary utility, but gain-loss utility influences behaviors
when uncertainty about credit risk gets involved. The model equates the reference point with the
probabilistic beliefs about outcomes and takes it as endogenous in the decision environment. Per-
sonal equilibrium requires a loan officer correctly predicts the probabilistic environment and makes
consistent optimal behavior given the correct expectation.
The model shows that under the Personal Responsibility System (PRS) where there is no penalty
for Type II error of loan misclassification (i.e. rejecting good loans), a loan officer behaves first-order
risk aversion and is inclined to reject a loan to avoid potential penalty for non-performing loans
(NPLs), suggesting credit rationing. However, when an additional penalty for Type II error is in
place, a loan officer, who now anticipates a full set of risk for penalty of any misclassification (both
Type I and Type II error), balances the two, decreases aversion to Type I error (i.e. approving bad
loans) and becomes more inclined to approve a loan than before. As a result, the credit rationing
problem is alleviated. Further, combining the model with dis-proportional probability weighting, it
suggests that ambiguity towards the application pool worsens the prior perception and lowers the
approval rates.
4.4.1 Incentive Structures
This section discusses the incentive structures loan officers face when making decisions.
A loan officer faces a lottery F ta =
(
θ, Bta, P
t
a
)
if he approves a loan and F tr =
(
θ, P tr , B
t
r
)
if
he rejects. The superscript t = 0, 1 represents the treatment status, 0 if it is basic PRS with no
other adjustment, 1 if there is an additional penalty for rejecting good loans (i.e. Type II error).
The subscripts d = a, r represents the loan decision, approve and reject respectively. θ ∈ [0, 1] is
the perceived probability of a loan being a good one7. Btd ≥ 0 and P td ≤ 0, d = a, r are bonus and
penalty under corresponding decision cases8.
The lottery F ta =
(
θ, Bta, P
t
a
)
can be interpreted as when approving a loan, a loan officer gets
bonus Bta with probability θ if the loan performs well and gets penalty P 0a with probability (1− θ) if
rejecting it and gets monetary incentives according to the loan performance later, we call it “monetary utility”.
7Or the perceived probability of repayment.
8Though there is a complete system to calculate bonus and penalty according to the loan amount, interest rates,
payment delayed periods, etc, for simplicity concern, fixed bonus and penalty schemes are used here and in the
remaining part of the model. The properties and predictions will survive with variant incentives merely by replacing
the fixed incentives with functions of all relevant factors, such as Bi = Bi (·) and Pi = Pi (·).
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it fails to perform well. Similarly, the lottery F tr =
(
θ, P tr , B
t
r
)
can be interpreted as when rejecting
a loan, a loan officer gets penalty P tr with probability θ if the loan actually performs well (penalty
for Type II Error) and gets bonus Btr with probability (1− θ) if it actually fails to perform well.
Under the Personal Responsibility System (PRS), a loan officer gets bonuses for approved loans
that are in good performance and gets penalties for non-performing ones. Since the performance
status of rejected loans is unobservable, there is no payment adjustment for those, i.e. P 0r = B0r = 0,
and hence, the lottery of rejecting a loan shrinks to a constant F 0r = 0. In order to explore
potential effects of the PRS, an additional penalty for Type II error is added to the basic PRS
structure. Use superscript 1 to indicate the treatment of additional penalty. Following the definition
above, when a loan officer approves a loan, he faces a lottery F 1a =
(
θ, B1a, P
1
a
)
; when rejecting a
loan, he faces a lottery F 1r =
(
θ, P 1r , B
1
r
)
. To make the treatment comparable to the basic PRS,
let F 1a = F 0a = Fa = (θ, Ba, Pa), B1r = B0r = 0 and P 1r < 0, that is F 1r =
(
θ, P 1r , 0
)
but
F 0r = (θ, 0, 0) = 0. P 1r < 0 represents a dis-incentive treatment for Type II Error, which is the only
difference from the PRS.
When a loan officer makes decision fully depending on the perceived probability θ, he is facing
a compound lottery of F t =
(
f (θ) , F ta, F
t
r
)
. f (·) ∈ [0, 1] is a probability distribution. The
compound lottery indicates a mixed strategy for a loan decision, that is approving a loan with
probability f (θ) and facing the lottery F ta; and rejecting a loan with probability 1−f (θ) and facing
the lottery F tr . The compound lotteries under two incentive schemes are now F 0 = (f (θ) , Fa, 0)
and F 1 =
(
f (θ) , Fa, F
1
r
)
. Under different incentive schemes, a representative officer optimally
chooses different f (·) 9 to guide his decision.
4.4.2 Reference-Dependent Utility
A reference-dependent utility u (w | r) = m (w) + µ (m (w)−m (r)) is adopted to capture a loan
officer’s feeling when making loan decisions under a riskless wealth outcome w ∈ R and a riskless
reference point r ∈ R. The term m (w) is the intrinsic “monetary utility” usually assumed relevant
in economics, and the term µ (m (w)−m (r)) is the reference-dependent “gain-loss utility”. This
9f (·) can be either continuous or discrete, or a mix of the two, over the domain [0, 1]. In linear case, f (θ) = θ. The
non-linear case can also be defined accordingly. For the most simplistic case, consider f (·) as a binary indicator, which
equals to 1 if θ ≥ θ¯, and 0 otherwise. This suggests that a loan officer approves a loan when the perceived probability
is greater than some cutting point θ¯, and rejects otherwise. Under different incentive schemes, a representative officer
optimally chooses different θ¯ to guide his decision. This is also the setting used for the remaining analysis.
75
specification assumes that how a loan officer feels about gaining or losing relative to a reference
point depends on the changes in monetary utility associated with such gains or losses (Koszegi and
Rabin, 2006).10
When a loan officer is uncertain about loan outcomes, the reference point is a lottery over R,
i.e. F td (·) as discussed in the previous section:
U
(
w |F td
)
=
ˆ
u (w | r) dF td (r)
This formulation captures the notion that the evaluation of a wealth outcome is based on comparing
it to all possibilities in the support of the reference lottery. A loan officer evaluates a stochastic
wealth outcome w with some “mixed feelings” as the average of the different assessments u (w | r)
generated by F td (·).
When the wealth outcome w is also drawn according to a lottery F t′d′ (·), utility is given by:
U
(
F t
′
d′ |F td
)
=
ˆ ˆ
u (w | r) dF td (r) dF t
′
d′ (w)
This reference-dependent utility model (a) combines reference-dependent “gain-loss utility” with
standard “monetary utility”; (b) bases the reference point to which outcomes are compared on
endogenously determined beliefs and incorporates probabilistic beliefs; (c) allows for stochastic
reference points.
A few caveats need to be mentioned here. First, up to this point, the model abstracts from non-
linear probability weighting and assumes that preferences are linear in probabilities. The evaluation
of a wealth outcome w is actually its expected reference-dependent utility. Second, despite of the
assumption so far, the model of how utility depends on beliefs could be combined with any theory of
how these beliefs are formed. In the next section, the model starts with the assumption that a loan
officer correctly predicts the probabilistic environment and his own behavior in that environment,
so that his beliefs fully reflect the true probability distribution of outcomes. The analysis then
moves to how prior beliefs are formed and how they affect the decision behaviors. Third, the model
specification can generate more realistic behavioral predictions. For example, a loan officer is less
10The separation and interdependence of economic and psychological payoffs is analogous to the assumptions made
previously by Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Kobberling and Wakker (2005). Discussion about functional
forms and assumptions of monetary and gain-loss utility are available in the appendix.
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averse to risk (of Type I error) with balanced adverse incentives and becomes more inclined approve
a loan . Detailed discussion are available is the next two sections.11
4.4.3 Decision Strategies and Personal Equilibria
This section discusses a loan officer’s decision strategies in equilibrium. Equilibrium cases here
are defined differently by the time a decision is made. When a decision is made shortly before
the outcomes occur, the concept “Unacclimating Personal Equilibrium” (UPE) defines the behavior
where the stochastic outcome generated by utility-maximizing choices conditional on expectations
coincides with expectations. The analysis further assumes a loan officer chooses his favorite UPE,
the “Preferred Personal Equilibrium” (PPE). When a decision is made long before outcomes occur, a
“Choice-Acclimating Personal Equilibrium” (CPE) defines a decision that maximizes expected utility
given that it determines both the reference lottery and the outcome lottery. These definitions follow
from Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Full description of the definitions are available in the appendix.
Both PPE and CPE predict strong preference to insure the expected risk of penalty whenever
possible. This prediction explains high rejection rates under the PRS and credit rationing problems
in the financial market.
When a loan officer makes his lending decision shortly before the loan outcome is resolved, at
that time the beliefs that determine the reference point are past and hence unchangeable. This
means that he maximizes utility taking the reference point as given.
In this case, for a loan officer, choosing to approve a loan is optimal (i.e. a UPE) if U
(
F ta|F ta
) ≥
U
(
F tr |F ta
)
, where t = 0, 1 indicates the incentive schemes of pure PRS and PRS with additional
penalty for Type II error respectively. More specifically, for example, under pure PRS, when Fa =
(θ,Ba = 15, Pa = −20) and F 0r = 0, approving a loan is a UPE if:
[θ15 + (1− θ) (−20)] + [θ (1− θ)µ (35) + θ (1− θ)µ (−35)] ≥ [0] + [θµ (−15) + (1− θ)µ (20)] (6)
11Other previous literature, though closely related, has various limitations. For example, Sudgen (2003) compares
outcome lotteries to reference lotteries state by state, capturing a form of state-contingent disappointment, but a
state-independent feeling is missing. For another example, Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), Gul (1991) and
Shalev (2000) allow the existence of reference lottery but collapse it into some type of certainty equivalent. With this
setting, reference lotteries that have some certainty equivalent generate the same risk preferences.
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This shows a loan officer experiences direct “monetary utility” from the choice he made and
a mixed-feeling of “gain-loss utility” based upon comparison between the choice he made and the
reference lottery state by state. Both utility parts are represented by expected value. Given a
reference lottery expectation, gain-loss feelings are generated whenever there is a gap between the
outcome and the reference state. Given expectation to approve a loan, when an officer chooses to
approve, he compares between a bonus of 15 and a penalty of −20; if instead he chooses to reject,
he compares the riskless payoff 0 to the bonus and penalty cases.
Now, consider the case when a loan officer needs to make a loan decision and commit to it long
before the loan outcome is resolved. In this case, the expectation relative to which an outcome of a
decision is evaluated is formed in the future, and therefore incorporates implications of the decision.
Under pure PRS, approving a loan is optimal (i.e. a CPE) if U
(
F 0a |F 0a
) ≥ U (F 0r |F 0r ), i.e.:
[θ15 + (1− θ) (−20)] + [θ (1− θ)µ (35) + θ (1− θ)µ (−35)] ≥ [0] + [0] (7)
In the case when there is additional penalty for Type II error, that is F 1r =
(
θ, P 1r = −20, B1r = 0
)
,
approving a loan is a CPE if U
(
F 1a |F 1a
) ≥ U (F 1r |F 1r ), i.e.:
[θ15− (1− θ) 20]+[θ (1− θ)µ (35) + θ (1− θ)µ (−35)] ≥ [−20θ]+[θ (1− θ)µ (20) + θ (1− θ)µ (−20)]
(8)
The difference between UPE and CPE is in the right-hand sides of inequalities 6 and 7, which
capture the decision maker’s expected utilities when deviating from the purported UPE and CPE,
respectively. In UPE, the reference point does not adjust to the deviation, so rejecting a loan is
assessed partly as a loss of $15 (if the loan turns out to be good) and partly as a gain of $20 (if
the loan turns out to be bad). In CPE, the reference point does adjust to the deviation, so there
is no sensation of gain or loss when rejecting a loan under pure PRS. This difference in feeling of
gain and loss makes rejection a more favorable choice for a loan officer who needs to make lending
decision long before the loan performance could be observed. Under the pure PRS situation, loan
officers choose rejection to “insure” the potential risk of penalty.
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4.4.4 Properties and Testing Hypotheses
In this section, three testing hypotheses of loan officers’ lending behaviors are generated for empirical
test.
Hypothesis1 : (Participation) For any incentive schemes F t, where t = 0,1, if U (w + Fa|w) ≥
U (w|w), then U (w + Fa|F t) ≥ U (w|F t).
Hypothesis 1 has two implications. (a) If a loan officer is willing to approve a loan under a constant
reference wealth level, he is also willing to make the same decision under some given incentive
scheme based on risky loan outcomes. (b) The loan officer is at least not more risk-averse in the
latter case than in the former.
Since loan officers, who are facing risky incentive schemes as background reference lotteries, are
less risk-averse than those (normal people) who are not facing any risk 12, they are at least not less
willing to make a lending decision than if they were in life. This guarantees positive loan supply in
the financial market.
More broadly,
Hypothesis1′ : If U (w + Fa|w) ≥ U (w|w), then U
(
F t + Fa|F t
) ≥ U (F t|F t).
Intuitively, when a loan officer needs to make a decision for a new loan d = a or r, facing risky
incentive schemes for all the loans he had made in the past makes him less averse to make another
(risky) lending decision. When a new lending decision Fa is added to a riskless reference point
w (as in the case of informal lending in life), positive outcomes of Fa are assessed as pure gains
and negative outcomes of Fa are assessed as pure losses. But when Fa is added to the existing
lottery under given incentive scheme F t and evaluated relative to it (as the case a loan officer faces
to) , positive outcome of Fa partially eliminate losses suffered from F t in the past, and are hence
evaluated more favorably than pure gains; similarly, negative outcomes of Fa partially eliminate
gains from previous F t, and hence, are evaluated less unfavorably than pure losses. For both this
reasons, a loan officer who had made loans in the past under incentive scheme F t is more willing
to make another lending decision Fa. It can be concluded that expecting risk at the start decreases
aversion to additional risk.
12Koszegi and Rabin (2007) interpreted this in a way that a person is less risk averse in eliminating a risk he
expected to face than in taking on the same risk if he did not expect it.
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Now consider the effect of a special incentive scheme - the PRS on decision behaviors. As
discussed in section 2, PRS, as an on-going incentive scheme to control credit risk in most RCCs
in China, gives a officer bonuses for the approved loans that are in performance and penalties for
non-performing ones, but does nothing for the rejected loans. How does a loan officer behave under
this setting? How does the behavior change if there are additional penalties for rejecting good
loans?
Hypothesis2 : (Insure whenever Possible) If U
(
w + Fa|w + F 0
) ≥ U (w|w + F 0), then U (w + Fa|w + F 1) ≥
U
(
w|w + F 1) .
Hypothesis 2 tells us for any given loan application, if a loan officer is willing to approve under
pure PRS (with reference lotteryF 0), then he will always be willing to approve it when there is
additional penalties for Type II error of loan misclassification (with reference lottery F 1). With
pure PRS, since there is no adjustment on wealth level for any rejected loans, a loan officer takes
this as a “secure” option to avoid potential risk of penalty for bad loans, whereas with an additional
dis-incentive of Type II error, this “secure” option is gone. As a result, a loan officer under pure
PRS will never take higher risk than the case when there is additional penalties for Type II error.
This “choosing insurance whenever possible” behavior under pure PRS makes loan officers be less
willing to approve loans. Therefore, credit rationing exists in the financial market. Hypothesis 2
suggests that an additional dis-incentive for Type II Error can make a loan officer be more willing
to approve a loan, and hence alleviates credit rationing in the market.13
In order to test the above hypotheses indicated by the decision behaviors, a field experiment
is conducted with loan officers at local RCCs in China. Detailed information about experimental
design is discussed in the next section.
13So far, all the results are based upon assumptions that first, people have linear probability weighting; and
second, the probability belief θ is correct and fully reflects the distribution of risky outcomes. However, when these
assumptions are loosen, a loan officer behaves differently. More specifically,
Hypothesis3 : (Ambiguity Increases Risk-Aversion) Loan officers are more conservative in making loan decisions
when they are ambiguous about the application pool.
Ambiguity about the application pool makes positive outcomes less favorable and negative outcomes more painful,
therefore, a loan officer is less likely to approve a loan given all others the same. Providing more information about
loan applicants and guidance for prior perception formation may increase approval rates and alleviate credit rationing.
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4.5 Experimental Design
4.5.1 Loan Officers
120 loan officers were invited to participate in the experiment via the internal staff systems of 3
local RCC Unions (RCCUs) at Heze City, Shandong Province in China.
Shandong is a coastal province which has relatively more farm and small businesses. As a result,
it has larger population and higher representation of micro credit loans. Moreover, Shandong is
also a typical province where the RCCs have been through effective structural reconstruction and
institutional reforms in the past few decades. Heze City is located in the southwest of Shandong
Province, and is a middle ranged city in terms of economy, population and geographic region. 3
out of 9 counties14 in Heze City were selected to conduct the experiments, Chengwu, Cao and Shan
County.
Each county has about 20 to 25 RCC branches (RCCs) that are open to the public and one
union (RCCU) which provides supervision and administration. The 3 counties were each requested
to invite 40 loan officers from their current staff to participate in the study, 10 officers per session,
2 sessions per day and 2 days in total. The three counties were also advised to list all their loan
officers and assign invitations randomly. In the final selection of the loan officers, each branch had
at least one loan officer participating in the study and some branches had 2 to 3. Demographics of
the selected and non-selected officers were collected and compared to ensure representativeness.
4.5.2 Loan Files
10 loan files were selected from 2 branches of RCCs at Cao County and used as sample loans for
evaluation in the experiment. The loans were previously approved within the past 5 years with
repayment status known by the experimenter. The ratio of “good” versus “bad” loans were set at
50:50, that is 5 of the loans were performing loans (PLs) and the other 5 were non-performing loans
(NPLs). In the experimental session, each participating loan officer was randomly given 6 out of
the 10 loan files to evaluate. In order to make sure that the participating loan officers had never
seen or known the loan files used in the study, the 2 branches which offered sample loan files were
excluded when recruiting loan officers.
14Strictly, 8 counties and 1 district.
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The 10 loan files were reformatted and reorganized by an identical structure. Each loan file was
divided into 5 standardized parts. The first part included basic information about the applicant,
such as application statement, age, education, employment, household background and business
information, etc. The second part was a handwritten credit worthiness report prepared by the
primary loan officer when the loan was first initiated. This report was prepared based on the
loan officer’s face-to-face interview with the loan applicant and on-site investigation of the business
situation. The third part presented photocopies of all certificates, such as resident ID cards, marriage
and employment certificates and documents of guarantors. The fourth part was standardized credit
scores and credit reports printed from authorized credit institutes. And the last part was basic
business information and credit reports for guarantors. Two guarantors were required for each loan
application with amount below CNY 100,000 and one more guarantor for every CNY 50,000 increase
in the loan amount.
Selection of 10 loan files balanced two considerations. First, it required enough number of loan
files to generate variation for the loan file evaluation tasks. Second, it required enough repeats
of evaluation for each loan file distributed across all treatments within the whole experiment, so
as to make comparison and inference. Loan officers’ evaluating different files and different parts
differently in terms of behavioral responses, such as time use, confirmed the successful settlement
of the first consideration. More details are available in discussion of robustness in Section 6.3. For
the second consideration, choosing 6 out of 10 can generated 210 different combinations in total,
but only 120 randomly drawn combinations were actually used for the study. By chance, no officer
evaluated 6 loan files that were exactly the same as another. However, since each loan file on average
appeared 72 times in total and 18 times within each treatment, these repeats enabled the tests of
treatment effects. Actual frequencies of loan files in the experiment are provided in Section 5.1.
4.5.3 Treatments
A 2 by 2 between subject experiment was used. On one dimension, the treatment was whether or
not there was additional dis-incentive (or penalty) for Type II error (i.e. rejecting good loans). On
the other dimension, the treatment was whether or not the prior probability knowledge about the
application pool was revealed to the loan officers.
Combining the two dimensions together yielded 4 treatment conditions. The Baseline Condition
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(BC) had no penalty for Type II error (analogous to basic PRS) and no prior probability information
about the application pool. It served as a benchmark for other treatments. The Dis-Incentive
Condition (DC) had an additional dis-incentive for Type II error but still no prior probability
information. The Probability Condition (PC) had basic PRS without penalty for Type II error
but had the 50:50 prior probability information. The Mixed Condition (MC) had both additional
dis-incentive and prior probability information.
To be more specific, on the dis-incentive dimension, when there was no penalty/dis-incentive for
Type II error, officers were offered the incentive structure (15,−20, 0, 0). It meant:
• getting CNY 15 as bonus for every approved performing loan (PL),
• losing CNY 20 as penalty for every approved non-performing loan (NPL) (i.e. Type I error),
• getting nothing for the rejected loans, regardless of their performance status.
In contrast, when there was dis-incentive for Type II error, the incentive structure changed to
(15,−20,−20, 0). It meant:
• getting CNY 15 as bonus for every approved performing loan (PL),
• losing CNY 20 as penalty for every approved non-performing loan (NPL) (i.e. Type I error),
• losing CNY 20 as penalty for every rejected PL (i.e. Type II error),
• getting nothing for rejected NPL.
Comparing the two conditions, no penalty for Type II error represented the basic Personal Respon-
sibility System (PRS) which controlled financial credit risk by penalizing Type I error only. An
additional dis-incentive (penalty) for Type II error was represented by the third (non-zero) number
in the incentive structure, i.e. −20 in this case. It would be interesting to show under the PRS,
risk-averse officers tended to avoid potential penalty by rejecting any suspicious loans and hence,
resulted in credit rationing problem. However, with an additional dis-incentive for Type II error,
loan officers no longer had the “secure” option to avoid penalty and hence, put more cognitive effort
in loan classification and became more likely to approve loans. Credit rationing problem could then
be alleviated.
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One thing that needs to be clear is these payoff structures were imposed upon CNY 150 partic-
ipation fee. By the design of the study, each loan officer could get as low as CNY 30 or as high as
CNY 270 depending on their evaluation accuracy. The expected payoff was CNY 165, which was
roughly an loan officer’s daily salary.
On the probability dimension, when it was not treated, the proportion of PLs and NPLs were
not revealed to the loan officers. When it was treated however, the officers were told that the six
files that they were going to evaluate were randomly selected from a loan database with 50:50 PLs
and NPLs. With the treatment of this prior probability information, results in the study can shed
light on how ambiguity and prior beliefs affected loan decisions.
4.5.4 Experimental Procedures
At the beginning of the experiment, treatment condition was first randomly assigned to each session.
Each county had a full circulation of all 4 treatment conditions with random order. Within each
session, the participating loan officers were given identical instructions before they performed any
tasks. The instruction consisted of 3 paragraphs, with the first one addressing the resource of the
loan files and definitions of PLs and NPLs, the second one explaining the payoff structure and the
third one outlining the standardized loan file structure. Instructions for the 4 treatment conditions
were otherwise identical except for the prior probability indication in the first paragraph and the
incentive structure in the second paragraph.
10 identical lap top computers were purchased to conduct the experiment. A visual basic
program based on excel was designed and installed on each computer to guide through 6 loan
evaluation procedures from the beginning to the end. The 10 standardized loan files were also saved
in the computers and linked to the program. At the beginning of each session and before the loan
officers arrived, the experimenter initiated the program on each computer by inputting the treatment
and the loan file numbers that were randomly generated ahead of time. After all 10 officers arrived,
the experimenter explained the procedure and instructions to all and used an eleventh sample loan
file to show how to do the evaluation on a computer. The loan officers were advised not to operate
computers until they were told to, but was allowed to ask questions if they found anything unclear.
When all officers were clear about the procedure and had no more questions, the experiment started.
The first page a loan officer saw on the computer was an instruction with the 3 paragraphs
84
mentioned above. The second page listed all the warnings, such as no discussion, no tempting to
quit the program, and indicating the experimenter if need to stop, etc. A loan officer was then
directed to a loan evaluation page. The loan evaluation page appeared 6 times in a row, each
representing one loan file that was randomly selected for evaluation.
On the loan file evaluation page, there were 5 buttons that can navigate to the corresponding
part of a loan file. A loan officer needed to press the buttons and review the 5 parts in order. After
reviewing each part, a loan officer was asked to provide a score (an integer number between 1 to 9)
indicating his tendency to approve the loan so far, where 1 representing definitely inclined to reject
and 9 definitely inclined to approve. It was only when a loan officer finished reviewing one part of a
loan file and reported his approval tendency, can he continue to the next part. After reviewing all 5
parts and providing tendency scores, a loan officer was given a chance to review the full application
with all 5 (separate) documents attached together before they made their final decisions (approve
or reject). The loan officers were told that the tendency scores were for reference only and would
not affect their final payoffs, but their final decisions would. Neither the tendency scores nor the
final decisions could be changed once they had been submitted.
Another uniqueness of the design was that the program recorded the time when a loan officer
pressed a button to review a standardized document and the time when he clicked a button to
submit his score or decision after reading the document. The time spent on each document can
then be derived by calculating the difference between a pair of the time records. Absolute time
used revealed the efforts put in the evaluation tasks. The percentage time used (out of total time
spent on a loan file) revealed the perceived relative importance of the corresponding document. An
optional 15 mintues’ break was built in the program after a loan officer finished reviewing 3 loan
files.
After all 6 loan file evaluations, a loan officer was asked to finish a computer-based survey
to complement the study. The survey included questions for demographics, knowledge about the
Personal Responsibility System (PRS), perceptions about lending accuracy, self confidence and risk
aversion, etc. Screen shots of the computer program, front page of a sample loan file and the
electronic survey are provided in the appendix.
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4.5.5 Identification Strategy
Average treatment effects (ATEs) can be identified by the mean differences between treatment con-
ditions. Specifically, behavioral responses can be investigated by the following model specification:
Yij = θ1 ·Dis−Inctij+θ2 ·Probij+t0 ·TimeTotij+
5∑
k=1
tk ·TimeRelkij+
6∑
k=2
δk ·Orderkij+αi+βj+uij
• Yij represents behavioral responses (i.e. lending decision, occurrence of Type I error, etc.)
for loan file i in the jth evaluation (during the whole experiment), where i = 1, ..., 10 and
j = 1, 2, ....
• Dis− Inctij and Probij are dummy variables indicating treatment status of dis-incentive for
Type II error and prior probability information respectively.
• TimeTotij is total time used to evaluate a loan file.
• TimeRelkij is relative proportion of time used in reviewing part k, where k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Note
that the 6th part, i.e. the final review was omitted.
• Orderkij is a group of dummy variables indicating whether or not the ijth loan evaluation
happened as the kth file being evaluated within a session, where k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. This group
of dummies control for order effects. Loan file being evaluated as the first one in a session was
set as default.
• αi is the loan file fixed effect.
• βj is the fixed effect for loan file repeats across all 12 sessions .
With this setting, estimates of θ1 and θ2 are the ATEs of Dis-Incentive Condition (DC) and Proba-
bility Condition (PC) respectively, with the sum of the two being the ATE of the Mixed Condition
(MC).
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4.6 Results
The empirical analysis in this section proceeds in 3 steps. After a brief introduction of the dataset
used in this part, results first show how incentive mechanism and probability perception affect
lending decisions. Credit rationing behavior, profitability of the financial institutes and loan supply
in the market are discussed accordingly. In the second step, results explore the effects of behavioral
responses, such as efforts, confidence and risk aversion, on loan decision and how they are related
to the exogenous treatments. Lastly, credit ratings for loan files are compared across treatment
conditions. Inferences about lending decisions and accuracy are made from there.
4.6.1 Summary Statistics
The dataset used for analysis came from 3 major sources. The primary part of the data was collected
during the experiment, which contained credit ratings of 5 standardized loan file parts, time used
in the corresponding parts and the final lending decisions for 720 loan file evaluations. The dataset
was then matched with the survey finished by the 120 loan officers after the experiment. The survey
included information such as loan officers’ demographics, knowledge about the Personal Respon-
sibility System (PRS), perceptions about lending accuracy, self confidence and risk aversion, etc.
Finally, business information about the 10 sample loan files used in the experiment was recovered
and complemented the dataset.
Table 21 lists demographics of the participating loan officers. 76 out of 120 loan officers are
male, which accounts for 63.3% of the sample. The age ranges from 22 to 48, with average age
at 34. The average educational level is 2-year college. Due to social development in the past
few decades, some younger officers under 30 have degrees as high as graduate level, while some
older officers above 40 maintain an educational level as low as middle school. The mean income
level is around CNY 3,000 to 4,000 per month. Participants’ professional training and working
experience are widely dispersed, ranging from one or two months to 30 years. On average, they
have about 2.5 years’ professional training and roughly 3 years’ working experience as loan officers.
These statistics match the loan officer population group of RCCs and even other financial institutes
in China. Furthermore, decomposing the summary statistics by treatment, there is no significant
difference between treatments. As a result, both representativeness and randomization are obtained.
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Table 21: Study 3_Summary Statistics of Demographics
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The 10 sample loan files used in the experiment are all farm or small business loans with
amount ranging from CNY 30,000 to 200,000. The duration of loan is between 12 to 24 months.
The applicants on average come from household size of 3 to 4, with age between 25 to 57 at the
time when they applied for loans. The average annual net income per capita is about CNY 20,000.
On the days of experiment, each of the 120 loan officers was randomly assigned 6 out of the 10
sample loan files to evaluate. On average, each loan file should exist 72 times, 18 times in each
of the 4 treatment conditions. Table 22 lists the actual evaluation frequency of all 10 files from
random generating processes. Loan files numbered from 1 to 5 are performing loans (PLs) and
those numbered from 6 to 10 are non-performing loans (NPLs). Each loan file appeared between
57 to 81 times in total and between 12 to 24 times in one section.
The mean payoffs are shown in Table 23. On average, a loan officer got CNY 163 for participating
in the study. Comparing to average monthly income of CNY 3,000 to 4,000, this final payoff is
roughly equal to daily salary. Payoffs are about CNY 11 lower in treatments with additional dis-
incentives for Type II error (Dis-Incentive, DC and Mixed Condition, MC) than treatments with
pure PRS (Baseline, BC and Probability Condition, PC). The former is CNY 158 and the latter
is CNY 169. However, the difference is not statistically significant. Since the payoff structure
88
Table 22: Study 3_Loan File Evaluation Frequency
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Table 23: Study 3_Final Payoffs by Treatment
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performed as performance salary for loan officers, the insignificance of payoffs between treatments
implies that decision accuracy is higher in DC (and MC) so that it can cover up the additional
dis-incentives. Probability treatment does not yield difference in payoffs.
4.6.2 Credit Rationing, Loan Decision and Accuracy
Out of the 720 loan evaluations, 375 were approved and 345 were rejected. The approval rate
is 52%. 75% of the decisions were correct, which means 578 loans were correctly identified and
178 were misclassified. Further, out of the 375 approved loans, 279 were PLs and 96 were NPLs.
The probability of Type I error (i.e.approving NPLs ) is 25.6% conditional on approval. Correctly
approving PLs implies generating interest revenues, however, Type I error implies losing principals.
In contrary, out of the 345 rejected loans, 278 were correctly rejected (as NPLs) and 82 PLs were
misclassified, yielding Type II error (i.e. rejecting PLs). The probability of Type II error is 23.77%
conditional on rejection. While correctly rejecting NPLs avoids losing principals, Type II error
makes the financial institutes foregone potential revenues. Table 24 provides a full description of
these rates.
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Table 24: Study 3_Frequency of Decision Accuracy
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In addition, Table 24 lists the frequency distributions across 4 treatment conditions. Number of
approval is about 10 (loans) higher in the Dis-Incentive (DC) and the Probability Condition (PC)
than in Baseline Condition (BC). In the Mixed Conditions (MC), the gap is enlarged to 31 (loans).
Number of correct decisions is 8 (loans) higher in DC than other conditions. Type II error is much
lower in DC, PC and MC than BC, however, Type I error is higher in MC than the other three
conditions.
Table 25 lists the panel logistic regression results of average (marginal) treatment effects (ATE)
on 6 lending decision measures. Each column of Table 25 represents regression of one decision
measure. The 6 decision measures are binary indicators of
1. Whether a loan was approved or not, Approve = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise.
2. Whether a loan decision was correct or not, Correct = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise.
3. Whether a loan decision correctly approved a performing loan, Correct −Good = 1 if yes, 0
otherwise.
4. Whether a loan decision mistakenly rejected a performing loan, TypeII = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise.
5. Whether a loan decision correctly rejected a non-performing loan, Correct− Bad = 1 if yes,
0 otherwise.
6. Whether a loan decision mistakenly approved a non-performing loan, TypeI = 1 if yes, 0
otherwise.
Treatment dummy Penalty− TypeII indicates whether the incentive structure had penalty for
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Table 25: Study 3_ATE on Decision and Accuracy
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Type II error or not, 1 if yes and 0 otherwise; similarly, Know−Probability indicates whether prior
probability information about loan application pool was revealed or not, 1 if yes and 0 otherwise.
Entries of the first two rows in Table 5 are estimated marginal effects of the treatment dummies on
corresponding decision measures. The combination of controlled variables used in each regression
is listed below the estimated marginal effects.
Column 1 of Table 25 is the regression result about approval. The ATEs on approval reveals
credit rationing between treatments. By definition, credit rationing happens if given loan applicants
that appear equal, some receive a loan and some do not (even when they offer to pay a higher interest
rate) (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). When controlling for loan file fixed effects, the ATEs on probability
to approve a loan represents credit rationing. Compared to the Baseline Condition (BC), in the
Dis-Incentive Condition (DC), the approval rate (or the probability to approve a loan) is 13%
higher. This result suggests credit is rationed by 13% on average under the Personal Responsibility
System (PRS). Further, in the Probability Condition (PC), the approval rate is 12% higher than BC.
Providing prior probability information to loan officers alleviates credit rationing by 12%. When
combining the two treatments, in the Mixed Condition (MC), the rate on average is 25% higher
than that in BC. When a loan officer faces additional dis-incentive (or penalty) for Type II error
and at the same time knows the prior probability about loan application pool, he becomes 25%
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higher in probability to approve a same loan than he would otherwise.15
Column 2-6 are regressions about loan decision accuracy. It shows that Type II error is 9.5%
lower in DC and 6.1% lower in PC than in BC, given a loan being a PL. These probabilities also
implies the percentage of credit being rationed from profitable clients (customers). A decrease in
Type II error implies a decrease of foregone revenues, and hence an increase of interest returns. In
contrast, given a loan being a NPL, Type I error is 8.2% higher in DC and 4.4% higher in PC. An
increase in Type I error implies an increase in loss of principals.16
4.6.3 Time Use, Confidence and Risk Aversion
Time used in reviewing each part of a loan file was recorded by the computer program during the
experiment. Total time used for one loan file evaluation was then calculated by summing up the
time used for all 5 separate parts and the time used for the final full document review before a
loan decision was made. On average, it took about 8.3 minutes (8 minutes and 18 seconds) for a
loan officer to evaluate a loan file. The longest time recorded for a single loan evaluation was 32.93
minutes.
Figure 5 sketches the estimated kernel density distributions of total time used for the 4 treatment
conditions. All curves are skewed to the right. The median for the Baseline Condition (BC) is
7.83 minutes. Dis-incentive treatment increases the median to 8.13 minutes and the probability
treatment decreases the median to 6.85 minutes. Combining the dis-incentive and the probability
treatment further decreases the time use to 5.26 minutes. These changes reveals officers’ perceptions
and attitudes towards loan files. Comparing to BC, additional dis-incentive makes officers devote
15Total credits approved by each treatment condition are calculated as market level proxies. In BC, CNY 3,950,000
was granted. In DC, it was CNY 5,050,000. In PC and MC, the number was CNY 5,100,000 and CNY6,340,000
respectively. If the treatment conditions are analogous to corresponding market situations, the market level credit
rationing under the PRS could be as high as 37.7%. This implies that almost 40% of the funding that should have
been available to the market is rationed due to the current incentive mechanism.
16However, one should not draw a conclusion of the overall effects by merely comparing the changes in Type I and
Type II error. Instead, profits realized under each treatment conditions should be investigated. Based on the loan
specific information and officers’ lending decisions, net gains in the 4 conditions are derived as firm level profits of
RCCs. As shown in Appendix Table 1, BC has the lowest revenue, the highest cost for Type II error and second
highest cost for Type I error out of the 4 conditions, which yields up to roughly 41.52% decrease in profit (as oppose
to the most ideal case). Note that numbers used are net present values. The interest rate is identical for all loans,
which is 1.1695% per month. Revenue from approving PLs is the interest returns. Cost of Type I error is set to the
loan principal. Cost of Type II error is calculated as a recursive function of cost of Type I as proposed by Nayak and
Turvey (1997), i.e. CostTypeII = r − (θr − (1− θ)CostTypeI), where r stands for interest return, θ stands for the
expected probability of repayment. Finally, the revenues and the cost are rescaled according to their corresponding
probabilities for comparison purpose.
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Figure 5: Study 3_Kernel Density of Time Used per Loan
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more cognitive efforts (and hence, more time) so as to avoid any loan misclassification. Probability
treatment removes ambiguity about the application pool. As a result, it takes less time for a
loan officer to make loan decisions. In the Mixed Condition (MC), under the combination of prior
probability information and additional dis-incentives, concerns of NPLs are no longer as important
as in other conditions, as a result, the time use is further decreased.
Figure 6 describes how time use changes during one experimental session of 6 loan file evaluations.
In general, for all the 4 treatment conditions, the average time use declines as officers evaluate more
loan files, from 10-15 minutes for the first file to less than 10 minutes in the last file. In addition,
the changing pattern suggests a sharper decline at the beginning for the first 1 or 2 files, and a more
steady trend for the remaining files. Comparing the 4 treatment conditions, the sharpe decline of
time use happens at the third file in BC, DC and MC, but occurs as early as in the second file in
PC. This difference further supports the implication that probability treatment removes ambiguity
and makes the officers spend less time on loan applications.
Figure 7 lists the percentage of time spent on different parts of a loan file. These percentages re-
veal the relative importance perceived by loan officers. On average, loan officers spend roughly 25%
of the time reviewing the first part, which includes the basic business information and household
economic background of the applicants. Another 20% of the time is spent on guarantors’ informa-
tion (part 5), including guarantors’ business information, household situation and their standardized
credit scores and reports. The third important part is the handwritten credit worthiness investi-
gation report made by the primary loan officer at the time when the application was initialized.
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Figure 6: Study 3_Total Time Used per Loan across Rounds
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Figure 7: Study 3_Percentage of Time Used by Part
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This part takes about 16% of the total time (part 2). It is then followed by the applicant’s and
spouse’s credit scores and reports, about 14%. The least important part perceived by the officers
is ID certificates, i.e. marriage and employment, etc, which takes about 13% of the total time.
Note that the remaining percentage is for the full document review before final lending decision was
made. Comparing the proportions across 6 files during one experimental session, the percentages
are stable, which implies that the perceived relative importance is consistence within all the 6 loan
file evaluations.
In addition to time efforts, loan officers’ confident level and risk-aversion are estimated through
groups of psychometric questions in the survey. Questions that are used to elicit confidence levels
are, for instance, “how do you think your loan portfolio relative to other colleagues?” and “how
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confident you feel when you evaluate loan files at work?”, etc. Questions that are used to reveal
risk aversion are, for example, “how much are you concerned about approving NPLs and getting
penalized?” and “how much are you concerned about losing you job if in case you approved NPLs?”,
etc. The response of questions ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 suggesting the least and 5 the most. Average
values of the group questions are then calculated as proxies for confidence and risk-aversion. 17
Table 26 provides the marginal effects of time use, confidence and risk aversion on 6 decision
measures. Each column represents one regression. The decision measures follow the definition in
Table 5. Explanatory variables are total time used in evaluating a loan file, percentage time used
in each of the 5 parts, indexes of confidence and risk aversion. Combination of control variables are
listed in the bottom part. Entries of Table 26 are estimated marginal effects derived from panel
logistic regressions.
Based on Table 26, loan decision is significantly affected by total time use, relative time use
in part 2 (credit worthiness report prepared) and risk aversion. For every 1 more minute used in
reviewing a loan file, the probability to approve decreased by 1.65%. In this sense, the total time
use suggests some level of hesitation. When a loan officer spent 1 more percent of total time on
part 2, the probability to approve this loan increases 8.62% . Risk aversion imposes a negative
effect on approval. For decision accuracy, confidence level negatively impacts the probability of a
correct decision. To some extend, this confidence measure represents some over-confidence level.
Furthermore, longer total time use and higher risk aversion imply higher Type II error. Higher
confidence yields higher Type I error. Spending more time on applicants’ credit report (Part 4 of a
loan file) decreases the Type I error.
4.6.4 Credit Rating and Tendency to Approve
During the loan evaluation process, loan officers were asked to provide a score after reading each
part of a loan file. The score indicates the tendency to approve a loan based on the information a
loan officer had read so far, with 1 representing definitely inclined to reject and 9 definitely inclined
to approve. In total, there are 5 scores recorded for each loan file. Note that as a loan officer reviews
more and more information, the score indicates his “cumulative” tendency to approve a loan. The
17Some may argue that time use may also be impacted by confidence and risk aversion. Actually, this is not
true. Scatter plot with linear fit of time use against confidence level (or risk aversion) shows there is no significant
relationship between the two. Hence, time use suggests effort only. Detailed results are available upon request.
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Table 26: Study 3_Marginal Effects of Time Use on Decision
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Figure 8: Study 3_Tendency to Approve - Performing Loans
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final score (score after reading all 5 parts) fully reflects the loan decision.
Figure 8 and 9 provide the kernel densities of the final score for performing loans (PLs) and
non-performing loans (NPLs) respectively by 4 treatments. On average, officers rated 6.43 (out of
9) for PLs and 4.87 for NPLs. The significant difference between the ratings (F=90.09, P=0.00)
suggests loan officers can differentiate between PLs and NPLs very well, which confirms validity of
the selected loan files. More detailed discussion is provided in Section 16.2. For both PLs and NPLs,
the Probability Condition (PC) and the Mixed Condition (MC) have larger probability density for
higher scores than the Baseline Condition (BC). This yields higher mean or median of PC and MC
than BC, with the former about 0.42 points higher (F=2.78, P=0.096) and the latter about 0.94
points higher (F=15.82, P=0.00). This is another evidence which supports Hypothesis 3 that prior
probability information removes ambiguity and makes officers more inclined to approve loans.
By Hypothesis 2, additional dis-incentive treatment would made officers more serious (or con-
servative) in rejecting loans so as to avoid penalty for Type II error. If this were true, one would
find officers became less willing (or possible) to rate low scores and/or more willing (or possible)
to rate higher scores in DC than in BC. These implications are supported by Figure 8 and 9. In
Figure 8, for PLs, the curve of DC slightly first order stochastic dominates that of BC, i.e. less
mass for lower scores and more mass for higher ones in DC than BC. This difference suggests higher
tendency to approve (performing) loans. In Figure 9, for NPLs, some mass for lower rates in BC
now moves towards middle in DC, however, due to the non-performing nature of these loans, the
mass for higher scores does not increase as it does for PLs. As a result, the curve becomes a tighter
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Figure 9: Study 3_Tendency to Approve - Non-Performing Loans
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
De
ns
ity
0 2 4 6 8 10
Tendency to Approve a Loan
Baseline
Dis-Incentive
Probability
Mixed
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.8156
Density: Tendency to Approve for Non-Performing Loans
distribution with relatively lower variance in DC than in BC for NPLs. This suggests loan officers
are more conservative (and hence, less possible) to reject loans in the Dis-Incentive Condition than
the baseline due to the additional penalty for Type II errors.
Table 27 lists regression results of 5 reported approval tendencies and the final decision. Each
column represents regression of one tendency. Explanatory variables include the two treatment
dummies, absolute cumulative time used by the time when a tendency was reported and relative
time used (in percentage) on loan file parts that had been reviewed so far. Combination of control
variables is listed on the bottom. According to Table 27, due to the removal of ambiguity about the
application pool, probability treatment results in significant higher tendency to approve immediately
from the first part until the last. Dis-Incentive treatment only performs significant positive impact
on the final score and the loan decision. It is only when it comes to the final decision, does the
penalty for Type II error become a concern to the loan officers. Effects of time use on score (or
tendency to approve) are universally negative on all tendency reports, consistent to the result in
Section 15.3 about (discrete) lending decision. Furthermore, this negative effect holds for both
self-effects from current parts (diagonal coefficients) and cross-effects from all previous parts (upper
diagonal coefficients).
4.7 Robustness
This section provides discussion about the experimental validity. Potential concerns come from 3
sources: first, the randomness and representativeness of participants; second, the successful selection
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Table 27: Study 3_ATE on Tendency to Approve a Loan
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of sample loan files; and third, learning or order effects during the whole study period.
4.7.1 Experimental Validity: Demographics
As discussed in Section 15.1, there was no significant difference in demographics of loan officers across
treatments. Randomization of treatment assignments among participants is guaranteed. Further,
in order to absorb all potential effects of demographic variables on the results, estimations are
made with these demographics as control variables. Significant impacts only come from educational
level and working experience for Type I error. The former has a negative impact and the latter
positive18. Moreover, the results of interest in this study are consistent when estimated with or
without demographic variables. Detailed discussion of consistency are available in Section 16.4. In
order to ensure representativeness, statistics for demographics are compared among the groups of
experiment participants, employees of RCC’s in Heze City and employees in the financial system in
China. No significant difference is found and representativeness is established.
4.7.2 Experimental Validity: Loan File Fixed Effects
The successful selection of sample loan files should have two major features. First, any loan file
should not be identified to be a performing or non-performing loan for sure. More strictly, no loan
file should be considered as good or bad with significantly high probability. This feature guarantees
the validity of causal effects between treatments and loan decisions. Second, loan files should be
randomly selected from the population pool so that they provide enough variation for participating
loan officers to response.
Test of the first feature can be conducted by summarizing decision and accuracy measures by
loan file and checking if the mean rates for any individual loan file is greater than 90% or smaller
than 10%. Appendix Table 2 lists the percentage of correct classification for each loan file. The
percentages range from 55.13% to 86.84%. No loan file is considered with very high probability to
be PL or NPL.
Appendix Table 3 provides the estimated coefficients of regressing the 6 decision measures on
loan file dummies, with a performing loan, File No.1, as the default case. Each column of the table
represents regression of one decision measure. The definitions of decision measures follow from Table
18Regression results omitted due to space limit.
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25 in Section 15.2. For the lending decision, i.e. approve or not (Column 1), files are only different
between PLs (File No.1 to 5) and NPLs (File No.6 to 10), with the former group being approved
with higher probabilities than the latter. Consistent with the approval tendency score in Section
5.4, results here suggest that loan officers can differentiate between PLs and NPLs. The loan files
are not biased. Furthermore, loan files do not make any difference in terms of correctness (Column
2 to 6), except file 6 and file 8. File 6 has a significantly lower frequency of Type I error (11 wrong
approvals vs 66 correct rejections) and file 8 has a significantly higher frequency of Type I error
(35 wrong approvals vs 43 correct rejections). These effects are fully controlled by loan file fixed
effects in all analysis. In addition, loan file fixed effects can also control other potentially influential
unobservables.
Test of the second feature can be conducted by regressing absolute and relative time use on
loan file dummies. Appendix Table 4 and 5 provide the regression results of absolute time use and
relative time use respectively. Each column represents one regression. Passing of this test should
show some significant coefficients and some insignificant ones with various values for each regression.
The intuition is that if the sample loan files contain enough variations, then loan officers should
review them differently in terms of time use. According to Appendix Table 4 and 5, selection of
loan files passes the test.19
4.7.3 Experimental Validity: Order Effects
There are two types of potential order effects. One is within session and the other is between session.
Within session order effect in this study can be caused by officers’ evaluating 6 loan files in a
row. Appendix Table 7 shows loan evaluation order effects on 6 decision measures. According to
the results, there do exist order effects. Comparing to the first loan file evaluation (set as default),
it becomes less likely to approve loans as the study proceeds. As a result, Type I error is getting
lower in latter rounds, i.e. Round 2 to 6, as oppose to Round 1. Type II error is only significantly
higher in Round 3. The loan evaluation order effects are controlled in all analysis.
Between session order effect in the study can be caused by information spill over within and
19Some may argue the variation in time use may only come from the difference among loan files in term of length,
rather than the content. Appendix Table 6 lists page numbers of loan files by part. Combining it with Appendix
Table 4 and 5, one would find there are still substantial variation in time use patterns even after taking the length of
document into account. The remaining variation should be due to the content of sample loan files.
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Figure 10: Study 3_Decision Accuracy Counts by Session
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between counties during the study period. There were 12 sessions in total, with 4 different treatments
conducted in each of 3 counties. Regression results with control of county fixed effects and treatment
order effects within county suggest there is no significant impacts. Figure 10 outlines the counts of
approval, correct and incorrect decisions across sessions for reference.
4.7.4 Consistency
In order to check consistency, 5 different model specifications are used to estimate lending decision
and accuracies. Appendix Table 8 lists the estimated ATEs. Results are consistent and independent
of model specification.
4.8 Discussion
This paper presented evidence from a randomized field experiment conducted at Rural Credit Co-
operatives (RCCs) in China. The experiment aimed to test the overall effects of incentive schemes
on decision behaviors in micro credit loans. In the experiment, local loan officers were invited to
make loan decisions using previously approved loan files. By randomly varying incentive structures
and availability of prior probability information, lenders’ behavioral responses showed that incentive
schemes and prior perceptions can result in credit rationing, which further affect loan supply in the
market and profitability of financial institutes.
Although the study was framed within the context of micro credit loans in rural China, evidence
shed light on many general implications about incentive mechanism design in banking under a
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behavioral prospective:
First, when expecting the risk of loss (or penalty) and the possibility to “insure” for it, a risk-
averse loan officer always chooses to “insure”. If an incentive scheme makes a loan officer face the
risk of penalty for NPLs (Type I error) but can do nothing for the rejected loans (potential Type II
error), it implicitly offers the loan officer a “secure” option of rejecting any loans to avoid the risk of
penalty. This conservative behavior can generate credit rationing in the loan market, increase Type
II error in loan classification and lower interest returns of financial institute. Second, when balanced
(Type I and Type II) incentives are in place, loan officers become relatively less averse to Type I
error because they must now contend with Type II error and balance. Hence, letting loan officers
fully expect the risk of loan misclassification can help alleviate credit rationing. Finally, providing
prior information about the application pool removes ambiguity, offsets negative prior and thus,
helps to increase decision accuracy.
In practice, this study contributes to the increase of stability and profitability for financial
institutes. For banking policy, this study adds value to credit rationing alleviation and credit
supply stabilization in the financial market. More profoundly, this study imposes positive effects
on sustainable accessibility to financial services in less developing areas and helps to promote social
development and poverty alleviation in the long-run.
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5 Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis investigates the role of cognition in the broader field of agricultural and food economics.
Three studies in the thesis each targets on one aspect of human behavior.
Study 1 deals with non-standard belief. Using overconfidence and self-attribution, study 1 inves-
tigated how consumers react to temporary quality failure and perceive food safety risk depending
on previous consumption experience. Results showed that people decreased the consumption when
facing ambiguous signals regarding the food quality, but would not cease to eat altogether. Due
to a taste of consistency, participants updated their risk perceptions and judgments based on their
eating behaviors. Even though consumers with previous experience could pick up signals faster,
their judgment was not better than those non-users due to a much stronger psychological bias. This
study offered an explanation for why consumers were universally irresponsive to public food safety
information.
Study 2 deals with non-standard decision-making. Using psychological terms such as cognitive
dissonance and confirmation bias, study 2 revealed how individual consumers inadequately process
information, pay limited attention to signals, and make decisions bias towards their initial choices.
Results suggested that consumer’s judgment and information processing depend a lot on their
initial beliefs or consumption status. Incentive compatible auction mechanism revealed consumers’
tendency to justify previous behaviors by bidding higher premiums. Confirmatory bias hypothesis
was supported by the finding that subjects with free-choice was more reluctant to change their bids
on the items they chose despite of increased risk perceptions. In terms of market responses, due to
psychological biases among consumers, demand curves were less possible to shift down under food
safety risk. Results in this study implied that consumers were less responsive to public information
due to their existing habits. Extra strategies would be needed to increase the efficiency of public
communication to promote health.
Study 3 deals with non-standard preference and its market responses. Results in the study
showed that asymmetric adverse incentive structure made a risk-averse loan officer inclined to
reject loans to avoid risk of penalty. This side effect generated credit rationing, increased Type
II error in loan classification and lowered the interest returns of financial institutes. Providing
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prior information about the application pool helped to increase decision accuracy. In theory, this
study provides micro explanations for macro level credit rationing phenomenon in the financial
market. Lenders’ reference-dependent utility under asymmetric adverse incentive structure broadens
literature on institutional mechanism design under uncertainty to a behavioral scope. In practical,
it contributes to the increase of profitability in financial institutes, alleviated credit rationing and
stabilized credit supply in the market.
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APPENDIX
Appendix- Monetary and Gain-Loss Utility:
A loan officer experiences “monetary utility” m (w) at a certain wealth level w ∈ R according
to classic utility theory. In this study, assume linear relationship, i.e. m (w) = w. There are two
major reasons for this assumption. First, the preference is defined over monetary wealth instead of
consumption. When uncertainty gets involved, an expected value is a more straightforward measure
of gain and loss feelings than expected utility20. Second, when dealing with modest stakes, even
consumption utility is very close to linear21.
In addition to the “monetary utility”, a loan officer also experiences “gain-loss utility” µ (m (w)−m (r))
when uncertainty gets involved. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) (K&T) prospect theory, and the
literature building from it, provide theories of risk attitudes for this. Most importantly, evaluation
of an outcome is influenced by how it compares to a reference point, with people exhibiting both a
significantly greater aversion to losses than appreciation of gains, and a diminishing sensitivity to
changes in an outcome as it moves farther from the reference point. In addition, people weight the
probability of a prospect non-linearly, overweighting small probabilities and underweighting high
probabilities.
According to K&T’s (1979) assumption of the “value function” µ defined on the difference be-
tween wealth level and the reference point w − r, the following properties are generated for µ:
• A0. µ (x) is continuous for all x, twice differentiable for x 6= 0, and µ (0) = 0.
• A1. µ (x) is strictly increasing.
• A2. If y > x ≥ 0,then µ (y) + µ (−y) < µ (x) + µ (−x).
• A3. µ′′ (x) ≤ 0 for x > 0 and µ′′ (x) ≥ 0 for x < 0.
• A4. µ′− (0) /µ
′
+ (0) ≡ λ > 1, where µ
′
+ (0) ≡ limx→0µ′ (|x|) and µ
′
− (0) ≡ limx→0µ′ (−|x|).
Properties A0 - A4 were first stated by Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999). A2 and A4 capture loss
aversion for large stakes and small stakes respectively. A3 captures diminishing sensitivity. Though
20Without loss of generality, same results can be obtained easily with non-linear, but still differentiable utility
functions. Merely rephrase the expected value as expected (consumption) utility would work. But this will complicate
the statements.
21See Rabin (2000) for the calibration appropriateness of this approximation.
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the inequalities in A3 are most realistically considered strict, a subset of A3 can characterize the
implications of loss aversion without diminishing sensitivity as a force on behavior:
• A3’. For all x 6= 0, µ′′ (x) = 0.
When applying A3’, µ can be parameterized as µ′+ (0) = η and µ
′
− (0) = λη > η, so that η captures
the relative weight attached to gain-loss utility. More specifically, the gain-loss utility can be written
as:
µ (x) =

ηx, x ≥ 0
ληx, x < 0
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Appendix - Definitions of Persoanl Equilibria:
Follow by Koszegi and Rabin (2006), in general, suppose a decision maker has probabilistic beliefs
over possible compact choice sets described by {D1, 1− q; D2, q}, where choice setsD1, D2 ⊂ ∆ (R)
occur with probabilities 1− q and q, respectively.
Definition1 : A selection F1 ∈ D1, F2 ∈ D2 is an unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE) if for
each l ∈ 1, 2 and any F ′l ∈ Dl, U (Fl| (1− q)F1 + qF2) ≥ U (F ′l | (1− q)F1 + qF2).
For the case q = 0, the decision makers knows the single choice set he will face, so F is UPE is
equivalent to U (F |F ) ≥ U (F ′|F ), ∀F ′ ∈ D.
There can be multiple UPE in a given situation and generically different UPE yield different
expected utilities. A decision maker’s expectation is based on his own plans on what to choose once
the time comes. Therefore, he will choose the best plan he knows he will follow through on.
Definition2 : A selection F1 ∈ D1, F2 ∈ D2 is an preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) if it is a
UPE and U ((1− q)F1 + qF2| (1− q)F1 + qF2) ≥ U
(
(1− q)F ′1 + qF
′
2| (1− q)F
′
1 + qF
′
2
)
for all UPE selection F ′1 ∈ D1, F
′
2 ∈ D2.
For the case q = 0, F is PPE if it is a UPE and U (F |F ) ≥ U (F ′|F ′), ∀ UPE F ′ ∈ D.
A major feature of UPE and PPE is the constraint that choice must be optimal given expecta-
tions at that time. This means that the decision maker does not internalize the effect of his choice
on expectations, so he does not maximize ex ante expected utility among the choices available to
him.
Definition3 : For any choice set D, F ∈ D is a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) if
U (F |F ) ≥ U (F ′|F ′) for all F ′ ∈ D.
If a decision maker makes the choice F ∈ D today, this will determine his reference point by the
time the relevant wealth outcome occurs. Thus, when evaluating his resulting expected utility, both
the reference and outcome lotteries are equal to F .
As with PPE, there will be a unique CPE, unless in the knife-edge cases. But unlike PPE, where
the decision maker can choose his favorite plan only from those that he would follow through on,
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in CPE he commits to his overall favorite lottery, which makes him even more risk-averse and more
inclined to “insure” the expected risk whenever possible.
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Appendix - Proof of Hypotheses:
Proof of Hypothesis 1:
In Koszegi and Rabin (2007), Proposition 1 says that under A3’, a person is no more willing
to accept a given lottery if it is added to a riskless reference point than if it is added to a lottery
and/or evaluated relative to a risky reference point.
Proposition1 : Suppose m (·) is linear and µ (·) satisfies A3’. For any lotteries F , G and H and
constant w, if U (w + F |w) ≥ U (w|w), then U (H + F |G) ≥ U (H|G).
For any incentive schemes F t, where t = 0,1. It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that If
U (w + Fa|w) ≥ U (w|w), then U
(
w + Fa|F t
) ≥ U (w|F t). Hence, Hypothesis1 is proved.
Similarly, if U (w + Fa|w) ≥ U (w|w), then U
(
F t + Fa|F t
) ≥ U (F t|F t). Hypothesis1′ is
established.
Proof of Hypothesis 2:
Proposition 4 in Koszegi and Rabin (2007) gives the insights.
Proposition4 : Suppose m (·) is linear and µ (·) satisfies A3’. If w + F is a PPE in the choice set
{w,w + F}, then for any lottery H, U (w + F |H) ≥ U (w|H).
Consider the case when making a lending decision Fa under a constant wealth level w is a PPE in
the choice set of {lending, no lending}, that is
U (w + Fa|w + Fa) ≥ U (w|w) (9)
According to the definitions in section 3.1, it can also be written as
U
(
w + Fa|w + F 0
) ≥ U (w|w + F 0) (10)
By Proposition 4, inequalities 9 implies
U
(
w + Fa|w + F 1
) ≥ U (w|w + F 1) (11)
Therefore, it follows that inequality 10 implies 11, that is, If U
(
w + Fa|w + F 0
) ≥ U (w|w + F 0),
then U
(
w + Fa|w + F 1
) ≥ U (w|w + F 1). Hypothesis2 is proved.
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Proof of Hypothesis 3:
Any probability weighting functions, and/or ambiguity aversion would work. Proof omitted.
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Appendix - Screen Shots for Computer Programs:
Screen Shot - Preamble Page
Screen Shot - Loan Evaluation Page
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Screen Shot - Sample Loan File
Screen Shot - Computer-Based Survey
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Appendix - Tables:
Appendix Table 1
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Note: Entries are simulated interest returns (Revenue), unconditional cost of Type I and Type
II error. All values are estimated by net present value and measured in CNY 10,000. Interest is
1.16995% per month, the current rate used by RCCs. Cost of Type I error happens with probability
no greater than 3%, as regulated. Cost of Type II error is calculated as opportunity cost of foregone
revenues (See Section 5.2 for details). The probabilities used are indicated under corresponding
treatment conditions in the study.
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Note: Entries are percentage of correct identifications by loan file under 4 treatment conditions.
By all, the probability of a loan file being correctly identified ranges between 0.55 and 0.87.
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Note: The table lists loan file fixed effects (FE) on accuracy measures. 0, 1 binary indicators
are used to represent corresponding loan files. FE are estimated relative to the default loan, File
No. 1, a performing loan. In general, participants can differentiate PLs/NPLs. There is no loan file
bias.
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Note: The table lists loan file fixed effects (FE) on absolute time used. 0, 1 binary indicators
are used to represent corresponding loan files. FE are estimated relative to the default loan, File
No. 1, a performing loan. Different significance patterns indicate loan officers evaluated loan files
differently.
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Note: The table lists loan file fixed effects (FE) on relative time used. 0, 1 binary indicators are
used to represent corresponding loan files. FE are estimated relative to the default loan, File No.
1, a performing loan. Different significance patterns indicate different levels of relative importance
perceived by the loan officers.
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Note: The table lists the number of pages in 5 standardized parts by loan file and the loan
application amount measured in CNY 10,000. This table complements Appendix Table 4 and 5.
Appendix Table 2 to 6 jointly examine loan file fixed effects.
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Note: The table lists the learning/order effects on 6 decision accuracy measures. Loan files
that appeared in the ith Round (i=2, 3, 4, 5, 6) during a session are represented by 5 (0,1) binary
indicators, with Round 1 as default. Results show that there exist order effects.
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Note: The table lists the estimates of average treatment effects on decision accuracies with dif-
ferent combinations of control variable. Results show that estimates are consistent and independent
of control variables.
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